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Book Reviews
Martin L. Friedland (ed.), Sanctions and Rewards in the Legal System: A
Multidisciplinary Approach. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1989,
pp. 224. $30.00 cloth, $14.95 paper.
A farmer owned a donkey and a donkey-cart. He hitched the donkey to
the cart and ordered the donkey to move forward. The donkey did not
move. He offered the donkey a carrot, but the donkey still did not move.
He beat the donkey with a stick, and again the donkey did not move. He
built a fire under the donkey. The donkey moved. When the donkey
stopped, the cart was over the fire.
This book consists of ten essays on the general theme of effective
techniques for controlling and regulating social behaviour. The authors
draw on the disciplines of management studies, history and criminology,
public policy studies and economics, psychology, anthropology, law,
sociology, and political science. They are, collectively, a modern
manifestation of Roscoe Pound's concept of law in action as "social
engineering".
The title rightly describes the volume as multidisciplinary, although
one author uses the term interdisciplinary. What linkage is provided
comes from the editor in the Introduction. It is evident that the authors
passed their manuscripts around, but the interrelation and cross-
fertilization of interdisciplinary studies are not to be found in the texts. In
fact, the recognition of the discipline of policy studies other than that of
each author is slight.
True interdisciplinary studies are hard to come by. Real live policy
issues do not recognize the boundaries of academic disciplines. Each
discipline, to be useful, must enrich the inquiry, but none prescribes its
scope. And there are real risks in such studies. One is the risk of discipline
insecurity. When a person deeply versed in a particular discipline finds
himself exploring a policy field in which he must rely on the intelligence,
integrity, and learning of a colleague in another discipline, he may react
by retreating within his own. Beyond the apprehension of reliance is his
concern that the product of interdisciplinary exercise will be intellectually
soggy.
Along with insecurity may be found aggressiveness: a team member
may fight to secure his discipline as the central one, to which others must
relate and defer. (As director of an industrial relations research centre I
once tried to put together an interdisciplinary team. I approached the
head of the department of psychiatry in the university's faculty of
medicine, who said he would be happy to be involved, and of course he
would have to be the director of the team.) Aggression may stem from a
belief that his discipline is superior (an economist claimed, in Chapter
Three, that "[e]conomics is unique among the social sciences in having a
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well-developed paradigm for guiding theoretical inquiry on any topic that
an economist chooses to investigate"), or from a resolve to manage his
insecurity with boldness. In any event, the struggles of dominance and
subservience can be both fascinating and disheartening to observe; and if
the dominance is not arrested it can destroy the exercise.
A third risk in interdisciplinary studies is lack of discipline, lack of
intellectual rigour, which is what I meant in the reference to intellectual
sogginess. A fourth is conflict over mind sets, over ways of thinking about
things, such as working from hypothesis on the one hand, and from
observation and experience on the other. Conflicts may arise from a
failure to identify that fundamental factor in analysis and communica-
tion. A fifth is a difference in the perception of the problem to be
examined, which in turn produces a problem in agreeing on the goal to
be realized. Truly interdisciplinary studies, in short, require a high level of
entrepreneurial, managerial, intellectual, and moral leadership.
The broad theme of the book under review is an inquiry into the
relative merits of sanctions and rewards as techniques for controlling and
regulating social conduct, heavily but not exclusively (a chapter addresses
tort sanctions) in the field of criminal law. We true westerners are
familiar with the admonition "If there's goin' to be shootin' there'll surely
be hangin'.") The authors' appraisals state the theme that rewards are
more effective than punishments and that an astute combination of the
two is probably the best inducement to the "actor" to "internalize" the
acceptable standard of conduct to produce a self-policing or self-
regulating person. Not all essays are that specific, but it is not difficult to
point their beams in that direction. Two essays address the question, if
rewards are more efficacious than sanctions, why does the criminal law
rely so heavily on sanctions, and they propound briefly a broader social
need of a retributive character: there's got to be a social pay-back.
Because of the multidisciplinary quality of the volume, I have decided
to present a brief account of each essay separately, in the belief that the
job of synthesizing is best performed by the reader to his own taste.
Besides, I have lived long enough to learn that I would write a very bad
interdisciplinary review of a multi-disciplinary text. My task is to try to
whet the appetite of the curious reader for the real thing. Some briefs
consist largely of selections from the essay. The authors speak in their
own words. Other briefs consist mainly of my impressions of the gist or
thrust of what the author was saying. My parenthetic comments are
interspersed throughout the text.
Chapter One: Criminal Sanctions in England since 15OO. John M.
Beattie, professor of History and Criminology, University of Toronto.
This is a one-of-a-kind essay in this volume. It concentrates on the
methodology of historical presentation.
The nutshell into which this essay may be squeezed is that in the 16th
century and before, the state practised deterrence of criminal behaviour
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by terror; in the 17th century deterrence and punishment by
transportation; and in the 18th and 19th centuries modification of
behaviour by reform and rehabilitation.
Before 1500 much depended on the strength of the central
government; the punishment for felonies was hanging, a consequence that
was tempered by the jury system: juries could acquit. In the 16th century,
for a whole lot of "social facts" which the author recites, there was an
increase in the demand for deterrence and therefore an increase in
hangings. In more philosophical terms, there was a firm identification of
crime with immorality and then with the development of institutions or
houses of correction.
The punishment for felonies of transportation in the 17th century
(which took some pressure off juries to acquit to avoid the penalty of
execution) meant transportation to the American colonies (Australia's
turn came later, with the loss of the American colonies as a ready
repository). More significantly, in my view, the author notes in this
period the roots of the notion that certainty of punishment is more
effective than severity (see later for a consideration of certainty, swiftness,
and severity as components of effectiveness, a point that runs throughout
my review).
With the vibrant second half of the 18th century and the early 19th
century came disillusionment with public violent punishments in crime
prevention (I wish I had read the article before a judge in Sudan asked
me a few years ago what I thought of the imposition of the Koranic
(shari'a) law that prescribes mutilation for theft, and so on; stoning to
death for adultery is on the books but it is easily evaded), and acceptance
that certainty is a more efficacious route to effectiveness (that is not a
tautology) than is harshness or severity.
Then in the 19th century came a rise in the non-propertied middle
class and the rise of middle class reformers (e.g., John Howard) and the
establishment of imprisonment and the goal of rehabilitation based on
penitence (and isolation and consequent insanity). It appears that what
induced moderation of these institutions was not humanitarianism so
much as evidence that they did not work.
Where are we and where do we go from here? The author does not
say. But he has given us a useful historical perspective.
Chapter Two: Sociology and Legal Sanctions. H. Laurence Ross,
professor of Sociology at the University of New Mexico at Albuquerque.
Background: "One might describe sociology as the study of the
interaction between behaviour and rules; laws can be seen as the most
formal and central of social rules."
Criminology: "The traditional statement of the deterrence hypothesis,
which originated in eighteenth-century utilitarian thought, is that the
effectiveness of the threat of punishment is a function of its severity,
certainty and swiftness" as filtered through the psychological profile of
the person being confronted with the deterrence. (This is addressed at
820 The Dalhousie Law Journal
greater length, to avoid overlap for purposes of this review, in my
comments on the next chapter.)
The Sociology of Law: "There are two key perceptions in the sociology
of law as it applies to the capabilities and limitations of legal rules in
regulating behaviour. First, the formal rules are often ideal, expressing
hopes rather than expectations; and second the rules are often an
overburden on the system charged with applying them .... strict
enforcement is an unreasonable expectation"; the task of "interpretation,
organization and necessary partial modification" of legislation "ends up
in the hands of 'street level bureaucrats"' - the police officer, the
building inspector and so on - exercising discretion. Three characteris-
tics of the law in action are: simplification (e.g. rules of thumb for
determining liability in automobile accidents), liberalism (a bad
settlement may be cheaper than litigating one's "rights"), and
arbitrariness (inconsistency).
Conclusion: There is a need for effective legal sanctions to be applied
with reasonable probabilities, the principal factors of which are certainty
and probably swiftness, with a very doubtful case for the factor of
severity.
Chapter Three: The Economics of Criminal Sanctions - Philip J. Cook,
professor of Public Policy Studies and Economics and Director of the
Institute of Policy Science and Public Affairs at Duke University. In
order to understand this chapter, I had to learn a new grammar of the
Anglo-American language in which, through the reversal of conventional
grammatical sequences, nouns become verbs, verbs become adjectives
and adverbs, and adjectives become adverbs and nouns. I think the
chapter could have been called "The Crime Industry: When Does Crime
Not Pay?" and the answer could have been given "when marginal cost
equals marginal gain".
The paradigm in economics for guiding theoretical inquiry has five
parts: (i) identify the decision-makers and their objectives; (ii) identify
available options and how choices will respond to changes in
opportunity; (iii) specify the conditions of interrelation or exchange
among the decision-makers; (iv) derive a characterization of the
aggregate consequences of this inter-action, with special attention to the
characteristics of 'equilibrium'; and, (v) analyse the effects on this
equilibrium of changes in contextual variables. The article addresses the
first and second parts, illustrated through the crime of motor vehicle theft.
The author postulates The Rational Political Criminal, and lists the
following reasons why individuals respond differently to criminal
opportunities: willingness to accept risks; willingness to break the law;
evaluation of gains; differences in objective circumstances. A key point in
the theory is that "a change in either the probability or the average
severity of punishment will cause some people to change their minds and
whether the opportunity is, on balance, attractive, and thereby change
their behaviour."
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The author then lists objections to the theory based on the conclusion
that "common appropriative crimes and much violent crime are not very
responsive to the threat of punishment", a conclusion based on Limits of
Rational Calculation ("The challenge to deterrence theorists is to find
predictable ways in which the 'psychological person' deviates from the
'economic person') and limits to effectiveness of communication of
threats, including certainty and severity of punishment.
The author then turns to three specific issues: (i) degree (intensity) of
involvement in crime ("what limits are there on the participation in illicit
activity of a potential criminal who decides that it is worthwhile to
commit his first offence"); (ii) certainty and severity of punishment (and
problems of allocation of scarce resources); and, (iii) substitutes and
complements ("if sentences are relatively uniform, then a greater burden
is placed on officials to create a stepladder effect through graduations in
the likelihood of arrest and conviction"). The author then expresses the
concluding thought on the deterrence process: "Once considered
carefully, the claims made for the deterrence mechanism seem quite
plausible and robust against the arguments that criminals as a group are
insensitive to the legal consequences of their actions." There follows the
promised illustration from motor vehicle theft, describing the nature of
the industry, market structures and enforcement options (including the
actors - owners, thieves, and middlemen) and their interactions, and
concludes with Notes on a Research Agenda.
This digest cannot possibly do justice to the article. If the reader's
curiosity has been stimulated, she can buy the book in paperback for
$14.95, borrow it, or photocopy it if she thinks she won't get caught.
Chapter Four: Deterrence and the Tort System Robert L. Rabin, A.
Calder Mackay Professor of Law, Stanford Law School, Stanford
University. This article on tort law makes for an interesting comparison
with the chapters on the law of crimes.
The author introduces his paper by noting "the growing disillusion-
ment with the deterrent capacity of tort law and the need to assess
whether the criticism is warranted." He concludes that the deterrence
theory has little going for it, because if consequences are not predictable,
liability is not a deterrent. The negligent actor is by concept not mindful
of the negligent nature of his behaviour. And if the basis for calculating
damages and hence if the quantum of damages is unpredictable, the
results are erratic and the deterrence theory becomes tenuous.
The author examines "area studies": (i) Criminal activities: toxic
substances. Because of the fact that harm is not immediately identifiable
and the causation is not always clear, judicial decisions become
unpredictable. Further, the discouragement of harmful economic activity
may deter socially beneficial activity. (ii) Commercial activities: products
liability. The judicial signal "often lacks clarity to serve as an effective
deterrence". (iii) Professional activities: medical malpractice Insurance
plays a mediating role. And the uncertainty of liability leads to the
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practice of defensive medicine. (What sort of work load can and should
the health care system bear and how should it be distributed among
users?). (iv) Municipal liability. Is the self-insuring municipality
insensitive to tort rules because of the absence of market constraints?
Conclusion: "An underlying theme - in reality, an organizing
principle - has been that deterrence is really many subjects rather than
one; it plays out quite differently, depending on the characteristics of the
class of actors to whom tort liability rules are addressed. But, no matter
the class, the efficacy of tort law as a deterrence strategy is open to serious
question. Even so, the logical follow-up question is this: deterrence
through tort liability compared with what alternatives? ... the other
principal goal of tort liability, compensating the injured, can almost
certainly be achieved more efficiently and equitably by other means."
Chapter Five: Methods for Measuring General Deterrence: A Plea for the
Field Experiment Franklin E. Zimring, professor of Law and Director of
the Earl Warren Legal Institute at the School of Law, University of
California at Berkeley. This is the second (and not the last) chapter where
I have found it appropriate to present a summary through the words of
the author.
The Limits of Field Experimentation.: "... no field experiment in
criminal justice will ever be executed in total conformity to its plan ....
"there are ... political and moral limitations on the conditions that can
be varied in the name of experimentation .... "It is clear ... that if
'intervention' evaluations are to be the primary building-blocks for
deterrence theory, progress will be slow and empirically justified
generalizations will be difficult - a condition that is typical of social
science."
Do We Need Experimentation? "... more than an axiom is needed to
support major changes in punishment policy .... "For most crimes, in
most studies, there is no significant negative simple correlation between
the average length of a prison sentence and the rate of crime. By the time
additional control variables are added to the equation, weighted to the
tastes of the researcher and processed through the sophisticated
machinery of statistical analysis, the published results are in disagreement
if not disarray." ... The problem is that crime does indeed vary with
circumstances ... "The second problem in interpreting studies of natural
variation is that of separating causes from consequences ... "The third
problem is that natural-variation studies shed no light on why
punishment policy varies in real-world settings, and thus on how easy it
would be to induce on a deliberate basis the kinds of policy changes that
occur naturally."
Conclusion.: "Methodologies and disciplines should mesh rather than
clash; deterrence research should not become yet another example of
what one observer called the 'cross-sterilization of the social sciences.'
Our ignorance is vast; there is more than enough to go around. Humility
in the use of a variety of imperfect methods gives the real hope of
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sustained progress in learning more about the impact of law enforcement
on crime."
Chapter Six: Sanctions and Rewards: The Approach of Psychology Joan
E. Grusec, professor of Psychology at the University of Toronto. This
presentation also speaks for the most part in the language of the author.
I. Techniques for Obtaining Compliance
Why are there differences in the way compliance-getting is viewed by
behaviouial and by social and developmental psychologists? Can they be
reconciled?
A. The Behavioural Approach. Skinner asserts that punishment does not
work: one should use positive reinforcement and educational inducement
of desired behaviour. 1. The Evidence: Both punishment and positive
reinforcement have transient effects. ".... moderate levels of punishment,
administered by a humane and caring agent so that the contingency
between the individual's behaviour and the aversive outcome is clear, are
just as effective in controlling behaviour as is the use of positive
reinforcements such as food, water, and money." 2. Side-Effects of
Punishment Punishment encourages aggression (other things do too).
Beware: Punish with Care.
B. The Social and Developmental Approaches: Control by either
punishment or reward is ineffective. The question is how to induce the
deviant to internalize the standard of acceptability and then to administer
his own approval and disapproval. 1. The Use of Reasoning: "... an
approach to socialization and induction of compliance that involves
sensitizing individuals to the impact of their behaviour on others will also
lead to flexibility in thinking and the ability to think constructively about
one's own adherence to societal norms." 2.Attribution Theory: "...
people are always looking for explanations for their own behaviour and
the behaviour of others." People who perceive that they have been
coerced into conformity should be less likely to internalize moral
standards. The role of persuasion, education and reasoning is to
minimalize coercion.
C. Research Support"... reasoning paired with firm consequences for
failure of obedience is the most effective approach to socialization."
D. Implications for the Legal System: "The education must help the
individual understand why the punishment is justified and modify her
values accordingly."
II. The Prevention of Deviation
A. Modelling: "... Observing offenders being punished should keep
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people from engaging in the punished acts themselves: if they see deviant
behaviour go unpunished, the probability that they will perform similar
acts themselves on some future occasion may increase."
B. Structuring the Environment: "so as to promote pro-social
behaviour".
C. Character Attribution: Attribution desirable (and believable)
characteristics to the child
D. Implications for the legal system "Modelling, structuring the child's
environment, and character attribution are all ways of trying to prevent
the initial occurrence of anti-social behaviour."
III. The Function of Punishment it includes retribution by society.
A. New Trends in Socialization Research- "A number of variables have
been shown to have an impact on parents' behaviour. Among these are
the physical attractiveness of the child, the child's reaction to punishment,
and the nature of the misdemeanour in which the child has engaged ....
"It seems reasonable to propose ... that such things as the amount of
anger aroused by a misdeed, the sureness that the agent of socialization
feels about the correctness of her position, the physical attractiveness of
the wrongdoer, and the reaction of the deviant individual to threats of
punishment all have an effect on the punishing agent that is apparently
unrelated to a desire to modify behaviour .... "To be added to these
variables is the need of individuals to see the world as fair and
wrongdoers as having been suitably penalized."
B. Belief in a Just World and Equity (digest not offered)
C. Implications for the Legal System" "... the punitiveness of our legal
system may exist more for the sake of society than for the sake of the law-
breaker."
IV. Individual Differences in Responsiveness to Sanctions and Rewards.
Aggressive children appear insensitive to punishment. Implications for the
Legal System: Sanctions need to be individualized.
V. Conclusion:
"First, ... education should play a more prominent role in the system
than sanctions, and.., education should go hand in hand with sanctions.
"Second, ... itself has certain needs when it deals with those who have
broken the law, and ... these needs must be taken into consideration in
any attempt at reform. Third, "attempts to influence behaviour must be
tailor-made to the individual being trained."
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VI. Caution:
"One is ill-advised to generalize directly from principles developed in one
domain, such as that of child socialization, to the domain of adult
behaviour and the legal system. Nevertheless, these principles may offer
some helpful guidelines for considering the function and usefulness of
present and future systems."
Chapter Seven: Sanctions and Rewards: An Organizational Perspective
Hugh J. Arnold, Magna International Professor of Business Strategy,
Faculty of Management, University of Toronto. "The nature of the
organizations, the quality of their management, and the character of their
systems of sanctions and rewards have a significant impact upon their
members' feelings, attitudes, actions and effectiveness .... "the quality of
management ... " depends on "the way in which managers make use of
sanctions and rewards."
Assumptions and their Implication: Theory X: people are lazy and
dislike work; Theory Y: people have a great deal to contribute to their
organizations. Dysfunctions of the Theory X Approach: it requires
proscription, prevention, and punishment, and depends on regulation and
supervision and the administration of sanctions. Three sets of
fundamental dysfunctions are: (a) the self-fulfilling prophecy,
(b) emphasis on process controls (process controls are much more
cumbersome and expensive to design, implement and operate than
outcome controls) and, (c) side-effects of punishment (resentment, anger,
uncooperativeness and the need for monitoring, and the fact that
punishment does not send a message of what is desired).
Empirical Results: A considerable body of empirical evidence
demonstrates the effectiveness of rewards in generating high levels of
performance in organizations and, conversely, the dysfunction of reliance
upon punishment. For example, in the matter of absenteeism, rewarding
attendance is effective, while the punishment of absenteeism increases lost
time. The most effective approach would appear to be a combination of
non-monetary rewards and progressive discipline.
Similarly, in respect of job performance, goal-setting and verbal praise
worked in the logging industry; and in occupational safety, employees
responded to the obvious but not always recognized point that safety is
for the protection of employees; it helped that employees participated in
setting goals. Recognition and verbal reinforcement worked. Again,
respecting salespersons' performance, personnel participated in
determining what is effective sales performance, and that was combined
effectively with the application of positive rewards.
Conclusion: Punishment can and does have an impact on employee
behaviour and some behaviour will bend only to punishment. But over-
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all, a reward system is more efficient and effective. But one must make it
clear what is wanted and not wanted.
Chapter Eight An Anthropological View of Sanctions and Rewards
Pierre Maranda, professor of Anthropology, Laval University.
I. Law as a Social fact (a holistic perspective). Law is a social fact, like
religion and politics. All societies have regulation mechanisms, or
sanctions. Social inertia is fundamental. It is a gyroscope, maintaining
direction, carrying human lives in ruts more or less clearly marked by
norms. On the one hand, norms can be elicited from behaviour patterns.
On the other hand, norms can also be defined from the top. Conformity
to both types of norms will be required and rewarded, and deviance will
be punished. And both types are teleological: that is, their function is to
ensure social perpetuation.
II. A Sketchy Statistical Framework (a digest is not attempted)
III. Sanctions and Rewards: The Major Regulation Mechanisms of
Inertia (conservatism). "The two main regulation mechanisms of inertia
are fear and seduction. Both operate on imagination as the facult of
anticipation .... In other words, a little fear goes a long way toward
affecting people's behaviour, but it takes a lot of seduction power to
achieve the same results. This facility of fear may be the reason our legal
system relies more heavily on sanctions than on rewards."
IV. Accident Proneness and Pornography (regulation mechanisms
acting on the imagination). Men tend to 'metaphorize' vehicles as
women. That relates to accident rates. Car drivers who had had no
accidents predicated the same attributes of their women and of their cars:
trustworthy, reliable, thrifty, very dependable though somewhat sedate
and slow in responding, and requiring good care. Studies of driving and
pornography make the same point.
Hypotheses on Relationships between Driving and Sexuality: (i) an
active sex life correlates positively with low accident rates; (ii) the use of
hard-core pornography correlates positively with high accident rates; (iii)
the use of soft-core pornography correlates positively with average
accident rates; (iv) abstention from pornography correlates positively
with high accident rates; (v) the efficacy of publicity for safe driving
correlates positively with the skilful use of images of women.
V. Three Outlooks on Sanctions and Rewards: A. Semiotic Capital and
Inertia. "Inertia level is determined by (1) the 'semiotic capital' of 'mental
stocks' owned by individuals and societies alike, and (2) by their
management strategies. Sanctions and fear will have a much greater effect
on people with fewer resources; conversely, rewards will have more
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impact on people with greater resources, who are less easily threatened
.... B. Terrorism and Martyrdom: ... to carve for oneself a place in the
tail of a normal distribution curve is a stimulating, rewarding endeavour."
C. Deviation and Creativity: "In order to be creative, a legal system has
to offer positive incentives that outweigh sanctions. .. "
VI. Conclusion: Law and Social Reproduction: "When we learn to use
rewards (positive incentives) rather than sanctions (fear and deterrents),
we will have come a long way toward a much more dynamic and
productive society, a society that will want to reproduce itself for better
reasons than just intertia. We can envisage a nation in which law would
be inspiring and ahead of the times instead of being stifling and trying
clumsily to catch up with events generated by imaginative freaks."
Chapter Nine: Achieving Compliance with Collective Objectives: A
Political Science Perspective Carolyn Tuohy, professor of Political
Science, University of Toronto. This essay is written from the perspective
of mainstream North American liberal pluralism. "The first section of this
paper presents a theoretical analysis of the distinctive competencies and
incompetencies of three pure types of social control when measured
against fundamental economic and political criteria. The second section
treats more practical considerations, recognizing that the choice of a
compliance mechanism in practice never involves the selection of a pure
type but rather involves changes to an existing mix of rewards and
sanctions in an established political and economic context."
I. Types of Control Mechanisms: From the perspective of political
science, mechanisms for achieving compliance with governmental
objectives can be classified according to three general types:
(a) command (force or obedience: the apparatus of the law);
(B) exchange (bargain and consent); and, (C) persuasion (education).
The selection of the instrument requries a consideration of competencies,
using the criteria of technical efficiency - minimizing the cost of
achieving compliance; allocative efficiency - achieving optimum level
of compliance; democratic accountability and participation, resting on a
base of rewards and sanctions.
II. Assessment of Competencies. A. Command" Mechanisms vary
according to the mix of legislature, bureaucracy and courts.
1. Legislative-Bureaucratic Instruments: What of technical efficiency?
What of allocative efficiency? (Decisions with high 'value' content should
be taken by legislators. Those with high 'factual' content should rest with
administrators.) What of democratic accountability?: it requires the
consent of the governed; for example, where product standards are
developed by a bureaucracy, whose interests will be served?)
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2. Judicial Instruments: They are laborious and time-consuming. But
transaction costs may be outweighed by gains in allocative efficiency.
Judicial instruments are not innovative. (An earlier paper describes the
judiciary as walking backward like crabs [Maranda, Chapter Eight], with
their vision firmly set on the past. I don't agree, and I don't think any
student of developments in current Canadian constitutional law could
agree; but the point is there to be made.) And judicial instruments are not
good for handling polycentric problems: they require a focus (even the
most complicated constitutional case requires an over-arching issue, no
matter how abstract it must be, to comprehend the contending details:
was that the basic flaw in "Meech Lake"? Liberal-democratic principles
of accountability rate high against arbitrariness; and high on
participation.
B. Exchange (voluntary, There are two categories of participants:
individuals and groups.
1. 'Price'-based mechanisms (e.g. car insurance rates determined by
accident record). More common in the public policy arena is a mixture
of price mechanisms and a command-based system (e.g. a polluter being
given a choice of paying for his pollution, and thereby being free to
determine the extent of his pollution). If the exchange is voluntary, it
likely will be less technically efficient. In terms of allocative efficiency,
exchange mechanisms are the most attractive. The individual will comply
up to the point at which the marginal cost of non-compliance equals its
marginal benefit. It can be persuasively argued that price-based
compliance mechanisms provide a form of popular control that can be
either a complement to or a substitute for democratic accountability and
participation.
2. Negotiation-Based Mechanisms: Compliance with general social
objectives is negotiated among key social and economic groups, such as
trade-offs in collective bargaining. Technical efficiency of the mechanisms
is not clear. Allocative efficiency of the mechanisms is similar to price
mechanisms: they encourage innovative solutions.
Given this variety, the number of North American contexts in which,
say, workplace labour-management committees could be expected to
deal democratically and efficiently with the control of occupational
health and safety hazards is limited. (Why has western Europe gone the
route of "industrial democracy" while the United Kingdom and North
America still cling to the model of "antagonistic cooperation"?)
C. Persuasion: Persuasion induces internalized standards of conduct
and objectives. Enforcement costs are the lowest. Allocative efficiency is
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similar to that of command mechanisms. Democratic accountability and
participation: persuasion is the most consistent.
III. Practical Choice: "Although it is useful for analytic purposes to
distinguish among 'pure' compliance types, any mechanism available in
practice will involve a mix of command, exchange, and persuasion
features. Bureaucratic mechanisms involve exchanges of information and
favours as well as command; markets are populated by hierarchical
actors and governed by authoritative rules. Any policy decision will
involve changes to an existing mix, causing heavier reliance on
command, exchange, or persuasion, and/or on the positive (reward) or
the negative (sanction) dimension of each of these types ..... Compliance
mechanisms are likely to be effective when they are congruent not only
with prevailing ideologies but with existing organizations of interest in
particular policy arenas." Policy determines politics and politics
determine policy.
IV. Areas for Investigation: The proposals are based on the analysis
offered at the beginning of the chapter. There is a role for "interdisciplin-
ary" collaboration, as in the 'Sanctions and Rewards' project.
Chapter Ten: Choice of Target and Other Law Enforcement Variables
Christopher D. Stone, Roy P. Crocker Professor of Law at the Law
Center, University of Southern California at Los Angeles
What is the best way to discourage unwanted social conduct? Replace
sanctions with rewards? Common law offences are not responsive to
modern problems, for example, felonies v. environmental issues. 1. There
is a risk of restricting useful activity. 2. The expanding class of modern
wrongs strains traditional remedies and forums (who is the wrongdoer?
what is the nature and extent of damage? what are the facts? etc.) 3.
There has been significant demographic change in society, including a
huge rise in the number and size of corporations and scope of public
agencies. There is a need to identify and reconsider the assumptions that
underlie our inherited strategies for steering social conduct. The object of
the paper is to identify and assess the range of variables available to a
society in its efforts to enforce modification of behaviour.
The Variables: Canvass the mechanisms for law enforcement and their
targets.
(1) The Substantive Rule Variables: Control strategies: harm-based
liability rules; (a) Harm-based liability rules (the author reduces these to
the unpronounceable acronym HBLRs). These are the tort rules. Harm is
the trigger; loss is calibrated to harm; intrusion into private decision
making is minimized.
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(b) Penalties: Penalties can be triggered by rules, occurrence of harm,
or application of standards (a priort). The sanctions are provable
damages, punitive damages, and fine. Penalties also include a public
ingredient to reduce the incidence of the offence. Quaere: is there a need
for a range of alternative "currencies" (cf. statutory power of discretion
given to labour arbitrators to devise remedies)?
(c) Standards: Penalties differ from HBLRS in that they detach the
level of sanction from the level of harm actually caused; standards differ
from HBLRS in that they detach the law from the harm-causing
occurrence (ex ante) and they limit choice (e.g. sterilization, preventive
detention). Standards appear appropriate when dealing with corporations
(the incorporeal legal personality).
There are three classes of standards: factor standards, which constrain
input; output standards, which preserve managerial autonomy;
bureaucratic standards, which impinge on managerial discretion. The
value of standards is that they are immediate and predictable (see earlier
chapters on the factors of immediacy, predictability and severity in
assessing the effectiveness of sanctions). The risk is that standards may
deter worthwhile endeavours. Limitations on the use of standards are the
cost of enforcement, the limited liability of the wrongdoer, potential
unfairness, and potential harm to innocents.
(d) Rewards: they reinforce good behaviour (see earlier) and they are
far less authoritative. The case against increasing the use of rewards lies
in the fact that enterprise does not recognize non-monetary rewards and
governments are inexperienced in the use of them.
(2) Target Variables: The mechanisms for law enforcement can target
the enterprise and/or the agent. It is less costly to go after the enterprise,
but vicarious liability has its moral drawbacks. (a) Other target 'sizings':
"As we move away from mechanisms that are not as directly profit-
oriented, and consider strategies such as standards, publicity, and the
manipulation of non-monetary resources, the range of feasible
alternatives increases." (b) Organizational Types: "Any reform that is
effected will be introduced in the context of pre-existing background rules
that vary among types of corporate target: rules (and application of rules)
of limited liability, immunity, respondeat superior, and indemnification."
(3) Enforcement Variables: Who will be charged with monitoring and
enforcement? The ordinary citizen? public authorities?
Conclusion: "... of all the control techniques for organizational
misconduct, the most promising innovations are bureaucratic standards."
I found this to be a fun book. My comprehension of the texts reflected the
peaks and valleys of my own comprehension and appreciation of
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academic disciplines "cognate" to the law. A fun book, and a humbling
experience.
The writing of this book marks the first stage in the program on
sanctions and rewards in the legal system, directed by the editor of this
volume, sponsored by the Canadian Institute for Advanced Research as
part of a wider program on law in society. It is a "sampler", with an
implied promise of more to come. At some point I hope the scholars will
attempt a full-blown interdisciplinary study. I should like to be around.
Now that I have finished this review I must hurry down to the local
public library and return my books before I incur a fine. I might also get
a smile and a hug fom the librarian.
A. W R. Carrothers
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Ottawa;
Honorary Professor of Law, University of Calgary;
Founding President, Institute for Research on Public Policy.
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E. Capparos et al., M6langes. Louis-Philippe Pigeon. Montreal: Wilson
and Lafleur, 1989. ISBN-2-89127-116-5. Price $45.00, 320 pp.
This is a collection of legal articles put together at the Faculty of Law,
Civil Law Section, of the University of Ottawa under the direction of
Professor Ernest Caparros.
"Milanges" is meant to commemorate the late Louis-Philippe Pigeon,
1905-1986, a Justice of the Supreme Court of Canada for 13 years. It is
recognized that Louis-Philippe Pigeon was a person of prodigious talents
and of equally prodigious labours. His involvement in the law stretched
over a period of fifty years during which he was at various times a
practitioner, a law professor at Laval University, counsel to prime
ministers and constitutional advisor to many governments. When he
retired from the Supreme Court Bench in 1980, at the age of 75, he did
not seek solace in a historical contemplation of his many achievements.
He chose instead to return to academe and for the six years preceding his
death, was head of the Graduate Studies Programme on Legislative
Drafting at the Law Faculty of the University of Ottawa. It is evident
from the comments in "Mdlanges" that even at the twilight of his years,
Louis-Philippe Pigeon continued to till his fecund fields of legal
knowledge and provided, to bench and bar, cogent and articulate
expressions of the state of the law.
The collection of articles covers a fairly disparate field of juridical
thinking and analysis. Professor John Brierly of McGill Law School
propounds the existence of a "Common Law" as the fundamental prop
for the Quebec Civil Code. Professor Mireille D. Castelli from Laval
presents a detailed analysis of the 1985 Divorce Act. Professor Pierre-
Andr6 Cot6 of L'Universit6 de Montreal offers critical analysis of the
traditional theories respecting retroactive and retrospective effects of
legislation. There is also a contribution by Professor Albert McClean of
the UBC Faculty of Law on the clash between doctrine and precedent in
the institution of the law of "trust" under the Quebec Civil Code.
It might be said that some articles in the collection have very little to
do with the late Mr. Justice Pigeon or disclose no reference to any
pronouncement attributable to him. While this may seem a shortcoming
of "Milanges', each article, in my view, reflects that strong sense of
judicial discipline, methodology and restraint characteristic of the jurist
the authors are commemorating.
The memorial collection is in three parts. The first part contains a
biographical sketch of the jurist and a bibliography of his work. It also
contains a conspectus by Mr. Pierre Thibault of all the Supreme Court
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decisions in which Mr. Justice Pigeon was involved during his 13 years
on the Bench. This list is considerable. He participated in over a thousand
appeal cases and he wrote reasons in more than three hundred of them.
Also of interest in that first part of "Mdlanges" is an article by Chantal
Jacquier of the Department of Justice at Ottawa and a former graduate
student of Mr. Justice Pigeon at the University of Ottawa Law School. It
is here that one discovers how much discipline is required in drafting
legislation and how much more complex it becomes when the legislative
text must reflect not only a duality of languages, but a duality of legal
systems as well. This whole field is one in which Mr. Justice Pigeon was
deeply involved throughout the years and Chantal Jacquier, in my view,
provides us with a clear exposition of the fundamental principles which
guided the jurist throughout.
Similar articles by Professor Ethel Groffier, McGill University on "Le
Juge Pigeon et la langue du droit" and by Professor Alain-Fran ois
Bisson on "Interpritation addquate des lois", open more windows to Mr.
Justice Pigeon's scholarly approach to statute interpretation. All the
articles contribute in a special way to the development of scholarly
writing and to the ever-growing respect of the more casual reader to that
kind of effort.
Mr. Justice Pigeon's thinking in terms of duality of language and
systems surfaces in "'Le Droit compari et la Cour supreme du Canada"
authored by H. Patrick Glenn of McGill University as well as in Professor
Groffier's article to which I have referred. Professor Groffier subscribes to
the notion that Mr. Justice Pigeon readily adopted the doctrine that the
fundamental law at the Federal level is English common law. Such is the
law at the base of Canada's Constitution. Only in cases where federal law
collides with the civil law is a civilian approach required to its
interpretation.
It would also appear that Mr. Justice Pigeon did not discount the
formula historically applied to distinguish the common law from the civil
law approach to statutory interpretation. In an article published in 1982,'
he adopts Ren6 David's comment to the effect that whereas the French
jurist looks to statutes for his fundamental doctrine, the English jurist
interprets those same statutes as mere exceptions to the common law.
If I may digress in that respect, I am far from sure that such an
unqualified distinction between the two systems remains valid. It seems
to me that over the years, the mutual influences exercised by both schools
on the Supreme Court of Canada have created a much less polarized
1. La rddaction bilingue des lois fdddrales, (1982) 13 R.G.D, 177, (cited by Chantal Jacquier,
op. ciL)
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approach. Indeed, it might be noted that the common law is becoming
increasingly replaced, amended, restricted or expanded by statute and
that civil law relies increasingly on judicial precedents. More and more,
it might be said, that we are maintaining distinctions without differences.
This phenomenon finds an oblique reference in Senator Gerald
Beaudoin's contribution to "'Milanges" where he surveys, in an article
entitled "Le juge Pigeon et le partage des compitences l6gislatives'" Mr.
Justice Pigeon's participation in numerous constitutional debates while a
member of the Supreme Court. Senator Beaudoin, although recognizing
Pigeon's constructionist approach to the division of powers in Canada,
nevertheless readily concedes that Mr. Justice Pigeon's approach was
"totally British in function". It was in the nature of the jurist's long
experience to deal with each issue with instinctive reserve and prudence.
He imposed upon himself a case by case discipline. Rarely did he let
himself venture too far afield simply because it was tempting to do so.
That same characteristic appears to be reflected in Mr. Justice Pigeon's
involvement in Supreme Court decisions touching upon the Canadian
Bill of Rights of 1960. This was, of course, before the Constitution of
1982 entrusted to the courts the interpretation of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms. This was before numerous doctrines of
interpretation surged forth into a veritable stream of new judicial
consciousness: The "purposeful" intendment; the doctrine of "propor-
tionality"; the textual as against the more conceptual approach to the
Charter's words and phrases. On reading Senator Beaudoin's analysis,
one may readily conclude that Mr. Justice Pigeon would have
approached Charter issues with the same care and prudence as he
otherwise exercised in dealing with the traditional clash between section
91 and section 92 of the constitution. As is evident in reading his strong
dissent in the Drybones case on discrimination on the basis of race and his
equally strong majority judgement in the Lavell case dealing with sex
discrimination, one may conclude that Mr. Pigeon's preoccupation, for
better or for worse, would have been much more to assure interpretative
conformity in the adjudication process than to build a public platform for
the expression of his personal, sociological, anthropological or cosmic
values.
It is clear from Senator Beaudoin's comments that Mr. Justice Pigeon
did not suffer from the traditional "discipline i l'outrance" which
characterizes many civilian or continental jurists and academics. Mr.
Justice Pigeon forthrightly recognized and respected the exceptional
rapport in Canada between the civil law regime pertaining to provincial
jursidiction in Quebec and the common law which is the underpinning of
all federal public laws. I note in this respect that in his book "'Ridaction
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et interpretation des lois" Mr. Justice Pigeon stated unequivocally that
Quebec is not purely and simply a civil law province. In private law, he
said, Quebec is a civil law province. In the field of public law, however,
the fundamental law is English common law. Mr. Justice Pigeon appears
to have been quite content and quite comfortable with both.
There is a certain synergy between Senator Beaudoin's comments and
those contained in Mr. Patrick Glenn's article on comparative law. After
tracing the 19th century movement among European jurists to adopt a
purely positivistic approach to law by the process of comparison with
various national laws to arrive at a greater universality of laws and
systems, the author offers an interesting vignette on what role the
Supreme Court of Canada was originally intended to play in that respect.
Such an intention, says the author, made evident at the dawn of
Confederation by the need to seek uniformity in Canadian law as an
agent of national unity in an embryonic federal or regionalized state, was
not, according to Professor Glenn, ever carried out. The techniques and
methodology for it appeared to create unsurmountable obstacles. The
sources of law, either precedent or doctrine, between the common law
and the civil law could not otherwise have guaranteed the purity of
either. The author does acknowledge that some concordance was
achieved by the Supreme Court of Canada in applying common law
principles and precedents to civil law disputes, but finds that the process
was very close to a one-way street with little traffic moving the other
way.
I recall in this regard that Pierre Azard, former Dean of the University
of Ottawa Civil Law School had reached similar conclusions in 1965
when he analyzed the mutual influences of both civilian and common
law judges of the Supreme Court, but refrained from moralizing on it.2 In
effect, according to this jurist, the Court in dealing with difficulties of
either doctrine of statutory interpretation, provided a comparative law
approach, in an effort to find the best judicial principle applicable to the
issue. As I interpret Mr. Azard's comments, no one could reasonably
grieve if through this technique, the solution could be found by the
application of English doctrine to a civil law issue. As the author noted,
if the legislature in Quebec should find and believe such intrusion to be
an attack on civil law's integrity, it need only pass a statute to re-establish
a proper balance, a policy solution which, Pierre Azard suggested, the
legislature seldom used. The result, unfortunately, was to focus the
2. La Cour supreme du Canada et l'application du droit de la Province de Qudbec (1965), 43
C.B.R. 553; et Le problbme des sources de droit civil dans la Province de Quibec (1966), 44
C.B.R. 417.
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juridical pundits' attention to the Supreme Court's shortcomings. My
own view of such Igislative inattention by Quebec is that it considered
such common law encroachments as banal or benign or otherwise not
worthy of prodigal attention.
I have briefly referred to an article in "'Mlanges" by Professor Albert
J. McClean of the Faculty of Law at the University of British Columbia
which deals with the nature of a "trust" in Quebec law. Interesting
observations are made by the author in tracing what might be termed
alien influences in the application of fiduciary laws in a civilian system.
I used the word "fiduciary" because conventional interpretation of what
is the nature of a "fiducie" at civil law gives it a meaning somewhat
removed from the institution of the "trust" at common law. The author
notes that since the enactment of the Civil Code of Lower Canada in
1866, the evolution of the law of trusts in Quebec has occurred much
more through the expedient yet unprincipled application of case law than
through respect and reverence for the traditionally hallowed "la
doctrine". Case law in Quebec is replete with decisions where a
pragmatic, functional approach to the determination of trust issues was
adopted, inviting of course the application of comparative law or
common law precedents at the expense of civil law doctrine.
Professor McClean does not make judgment calls on that pheno-
menon. He leaves it to the reader, however, to draw his own conclusions
when he remarks that after some 125 years of debate, followed by a draft
of a Revised Civil Code in 1977, followed by an Act to Add the Reformed
Laws of Persons, Successions and Property to the Civil Code of Quebec
in 1987, (an act incidentally, which, as regards the law of trusts, has yet
to be proclaimed), the proponents of the doctrinaire approach to that
particular institution have yet to come to terms between themselves.
Academic writers have continued to be engaged in long dissertations as
to the ownership of trust property, as to whether such property does or
does not constitute an independent legal person or as to whether the very
subtle application of the doctrine of "le patrimoine d'affectation" is
warranted.
Professor McClean, enjoying perhaps an Olympian view of this
eastern disharmony from his Coastal Mountain heights, looks upon this
phenomenon as evidence of the vitality of "la doctrine" in civilian circles,
a vitality which has been made manifest by the renewed reluctance of
civilian jurists to slide into a jurisprudential common law approach to the
law of trusts in Quebec. At the risk of misinterpreting his message, the
author's subtle suggestion might be that civil law jurists should clean up
their act once and for all and realize that strict adherence to civilian
doctrine in the matter of trusts perpetuates an anomaly difficult to
reconcile with current needs.
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Civil Law Dean Raymond Landry at the University of Ottawa
provides us with an interesting article on Mr. Justice Pigeon's influence
on Canadian bankruptcy law. Dean Landry is satisfied that this particular
institution imposes a multi-disciplinary approach to its interpretation,
replete as it is with elements of constitutional, international, civil, penal,
commercial and administrative dimensions. The law has consequently
provoked countless debates and indeed the author notes that since 1975
six major amending statutes have been adopted by Parliament on
bankruptcy and insolvency issues.
Dean Landry suggests that part of the problem in the administration of
a bankrupt estate is the presence of innumerable procedural rules which,
in the hands of skilful counsel, have a tendency to increase legal costs and
thereby fritter away whatever assets the debtor might otherwise have for
distribution to his creditors. In the case of Pacific Mobile Corporation v.
Hunter Douglas Canada Limited, [1979] S.C.R. 842, Mr. Justice Pigeon,
in refusing leave to appeal by the debtor corporation, was so incensed at
the futility of the proceedings that he assessed costs against the debtor's
solicitors personally. His Lordship stated quite unequivocably that it
would not be fair to make the debtor's creditors bear the cost of
proceedings which were not instituted in their interest.
In Kozack v. Richter [1974] S.C.R. 832, the Supreme Court of Canada
had to consider section 142(2) of the Bankruptcy Act which provides that
a bankrupt may be discharged upon terms such as an order for payment
of periodic sums to the creditors.
The debtor in that case had sought the protection of the statute when,
already of modest means, he faced a judgement in damages against him
of some $12,000 and costs. The damage had been caused by the "wilful
and wanton misconduct" of the debtor.
At first intance, the Bankruptcy Court had merely ordered that the
debtor's discharge be suspended for three months. The Court of Appeal
had in turn imposed on the debtor the payment of $1800 in monthly
payments of $50.00 each. On further appeal to the Supreme Court of
Canada, Mr. Justice Pigeon, on behalf of the majority, reviewed the
parameters of the discretion exercisable under section 142(2) of the Act,
decided that it was a proper case to justify the Court's intervention and
increased the sum payable by the bankrupt to 50% of the damage award.
Mr. Justice Pigeon said:
"The result of the order appealed from is that the appellant will recover
nothing. With respect, I cannot agree that this is in conformity with the
proper principles to be applied in the exercise of the discretion vested in
the Courts by the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act"
Referring to the standard set down in section 143 of the Act where
there is imposed on a bankrupt the burden of proving that when his assets
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are less than fifty percent of his liabilities, it is due "to circumstances for
which he cannot justly be held to be responsible", his Lordship concluded
that the debtor's "wilfil and wanton misconduct" in causing the damages
was not the kind of circumstance to absolve him. It would be, according
to Mr. Justice Pigeon, tantamount to making of the Bankruptcy Act a
complete refuge against any damage award, a situation which Mr. Justice
Pigeon found to be against public order.
His concern for public order and his resistance to any attempt to
circumvent the legislator's intention are also found in the reasons he
delivered in the leading case of Deputy Minister of Revenue v. Rain ville,
[1980] S.C.R. 35. In that case, the Court rebuffed attempts by a
provincial legislature to redefine "privileges", and thereby provide to
provincial Crown debts a special preference against a bankrupt's estate
contrary to the scheme of distribution found in Section 107 of the
Bankruptcy Act In Mr. Justice Pigeon's opinion, "such a result would be
contrary to the intention of Parliament".
The principle laid down in Rainville was made to apply in any number
of so-called "privileged claims" created by provincial statutes against the
assets of a bankrupt. All these attempts to establish ranking other than
those laid down in the Bankruptcy Act, were unsuccessful.
Dean Landry observes from the foregoing review the extent to which
the requirements of public order, the suppression of abuses and the pre-
eminence of federal powers under section 91 of the Constitution were
preserved by Mr. Justice Pigeon's own pre-eminence in the field of
statute interpretation and in his meticulous applications of diverse canons
of construction.
Another article, this one by Professor Louise Viau of l'Universit6 de
Montreal makes easy reading for all lawyers and jurists in Canada,
irrespective of their particular adherence to a common law or civil law
discipline. The article entitled "L'impact de la Charte canadienne des
droits et libertis sur les rigimes de responsabiliti pinale'" The author
focuses on the parameters articulated by Dickson, J. (as he then was) in
the Sault Ste-Marie case reported at [1978] 2 S.C.R. 1299, when dealing
with the doctrines applicable to breaches of various statutes by excepting
mens rea and proof beyond a reasonable doubt as the basic ingredient to
determine culpability. Dickson J. was called upon to define the concept
of strict liability under certain statutes and the concept of absolute
liability under other statues.
In the field of strict liability, Professor Viau suggests that S. 11 (d) of the
1982 Charter now requires a whole new look at the categories laid down
in 1978. Section 11 (d) of the Charter speaks of the presumption of
innocence, a fundamental doctrine difficult to reconcile with Dickson J.'s
1978 statement that for strict liability offences, there exists a presumption
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of guilt rebuttable only on the accused being able to exculpate himself by
evidence that on a balance of probabilities there was an absence of fault.
The author raises the point on the strength of the Supreme Court of
Canada decision in R. v. Oakes [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103, where the
constitutionality of Section 8 of the Narcotics Control Act was
scrutinized. This section, as is well known, provided that upon a finding
of possession of a prohibited drug, the burden shifted to the accused to
prove beyond the balance of probabilities that such possession was not
for the purposes of trafficking. Otherwise a trafficking conviction would
follow. The Supreme Court of Canada struck down that particular rider
on the grounds that it was a breach of the presumption of innocence
formally declared in section 11 (d) of the Charter.
Professor Viau suggests, therefore, that any breach of a statute
imposing strict liability will have to be looked at again to see if the pre-
Charter principle in that respect still applies. Her view, of course, is that
she can find no essential difference in the application of the strict liability
doctrine as between provisions in the criminal statute and other statutes
which are much more regulatory in scope and purpose.
In inviting the Supreme Court of Canada to look again at the Sault
Ste-Marie doctrine, in the light of the Oakes decision, Professor Viau
makes no prediction as to how the Court might deal with it. Her
comment is to the effect that she has given up on making book on
Supreme Court orientation and approach. I find a refreshing sense of
maturity and wisdom in that comment.
Another article in "Milanges" is entitled "La crise du droit transitoire
canadien" It is authored by Professor Pierre-Andr6 C6t of l'Universit6
de Montreal Law Faculty and offers a critical analysis of current doctrine
in giving retrospective and retroactive effects to legislation.
The author suggests that current interpretation rules in this respect are
both incomplete and imprecise. He cites as an example the definition
provided in Craies' on Statute Law, 9th Ed., Sweet & Maxwell, 1971 as
follows:
"A statute is deemed to be retroactive which takes away or impairs any
vested right acquired under existing laws, or creates a new obligation or
imposes a new duty or attaches a new disability in respect to transactions
or consideration already past."
Professor C6t6 sees in this definition a field of confusion with the
doctrine of acquired rights. He suggests that a distinction be maintained
between the non-retroactivity rule and the preservation of acquired
rights. As an example, he dismisses as unimportant the principle that
procedural rules have retroactive effect. The basic substantive principle,
he notes, should be that there are no acquired rights in procedural rules.
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The other critical base exploited by the author is that current doctrine
is incomplete. Current doctrine, he says, ignores totally the concept of "la
survie de la loi" and which is reflected in the various statutory provisions
of section 43 and section 44 of the Interpretation Act, R.S.C. 1985, Chap.
1-21.
The author concedes that the foregoing shortcomings have prompted
more contemporary writers, among them E.A. Dreidger, Louis C6t and
others to conceive of a new approach. Yet the author disagrees with the
definition given by Driedger that a retroactive statute is one that changes
the law as of a time prior to its enactment while a retrospective statute is
one that attaches new consequences to an event that occurred prior to its
enactment. The flaw in this approach, according to Professor C6t is that
it deals exclusively with the statute itself and fails to consider its
"application".
Professor C6t suggests that doctrinal reform in this whole field of
statute retroactivity should adopt a dual approach, one being
methodological and the other conceptual and terminological. He deems
it essential that this double-edged approach be maintained throughout so
that order, consistency, clarity and integrity be achieved. In this respect,
the author does not provide the answers, but he certainly makes a valiant
effort to articulate the questions.
The foregoing review is a simple tour d'horizon of the various articles
in "'Milanges'" As the reader will have noted, the manner of treatment by
each individual author is evidence of a strong scholarly bent and
undoubted analytical talent. The authors come from various schools and
from various parts of the country. The civilian strain nevertheless
permeates the whole collection and numerous are the comments and
observations indicating a renewed attachment for "la doctrine".
The articles certainly create an impression that contemporary civilists,
in Quebec at least, are going through a conscious effort to re-emphasize
the roots of civil law, restore its legitimacy and perhaps its "sovereignty"
as well. Yet the authors' comments and observations appear to be bereft
of ideological colouring and even their most unqualified statements,
propositions and conclusions are well within the bounds of legal
discipline. Discipline A l'outrance, at times, but discipline nevertheless.
If the purpose of the "Milanges" collection was to pay tribute to Mr.
Justice Pigeon, regarded throughout Canada as one of our most eminent
jurist, scholar and judge, I suggest that that purpose has been amply
achieved. The analytical and unyielding performance of Mr. Justice
Pigeon throughout his career is reflected in the work provided to us by
his younger successors. Not all of their individual performances are of
equal quality and, at times, clarity of thought and brevity of expression
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are wanting. These shortcomings, however, in no way detract from their
inherent distinction and professional accomplishments.
I regret being unable to provide full coverage to all of the articles in the
collection. Some of them, of course, make tough sledding for those of us
engaged in somewhat more prosaic pursuits. I am satisfied, however, that
most of them are of a nature to pique any common law reader's curiosity
and provide continuing intellectual enrichment to him.
Professor Ernest Capparos and his editorial team have done an
excellent job in putting "Mdlanges Louis-Philippe Pigeon" together and
they should be commended for it.
Mr. Justice Marcel Joyal
Federal Court of Canada.
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Maxwell Cohen OC, QC and Margaret E. Gouin, eds. Lawyers and the
Nuclear Debate. University of Ottawa Press, 1988, xv and 419 pp.
The volume under review constitutes a valuable and exciting
contribution to the whole nuclear debate. Its distinctiveness, perhaps, lies
in the format. A mix of more formal and prepared papers, less formal
papers, interventions and discussions provides an interesting example of
the genre. While one is clearly not dealing with an academic treatise, the
style of the compilation enhances the feeling of acute concern,
spontaneity and the sense of the contemporary significance of the whole
enterprise.
The book constitutes the Proceedings of the Canadian Conference on
Nuclear Weapons and the Law, held in 1987, and is the product of a
happy collaboration of academic and practising lawyers. The vast array
of distinguished Canadian and international participants speaks for itself.
The fact that the book was published so soon after the conference is a
tribute to the dedication of the conference organisers and a source of
wonderment to the rest of us.
The importance of the general topic of this conference has increased
and not diminished with the passage of time since it was held. Although
the ending of the cold war and the substantial easing of the postures
maintained by the NATO and Warsaw Pact Alliances has transformed
the nuclear debate and drawn a happy line under the various Star War
enterprises of a more fanciful nature, several of the issues discussed keenly
and skilfully in the book have gained in significance. Of these, one could
point to the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the verification debate, and
the role of national law and procedures in relation to executive decisions
on international policy matters.
The book itself is organised in terms of the eight panel sessions that
took place, each one composed of distinguished Canadian and
international speakers. The subjects of the panel presentations ranged
from "Science and Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Nuclear Age" to
"The Responsibility of the Legal Profession". After each panel session, a
discussion was held, during which the panelists also responded and it is
these oral interventions and contributions that are often the most
fascinating. Also contained in the book are a number of supplementary
papers submitted to the conference by distinguished authors in English
and French unable to present them in the context of the various panels.
Of these, two could be particularly mentioned. First, the interesting legal
analysis of the 1973 statements of the International Committee of the
Red Cross concerning atomic warfare by Karl Josef Partsch in the
context of the subsequent Additional Protocols of 1977. This concluded
by emphasising that states cannot use the statements as a basis for the
right to retain atomic weapons and this is of some importance.
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Secondly, one should draw attention to the essay by Henri Meyrowitz,
one of the leading writers on nuclear weapons and the law. This is
entitled "Le Regime des Armes Nucleaires Selon le Droit de la Guerre"
and constitutes a stimulating contribution, as one would expect, to the
debate.
One of the most impressive aspects of the book is the range of expertise
gathered together. Panel 1, for example, on "Science and Weapons of
Mass Destruction in the Nuclear Age", chaired by the Attorney General
of Ontario, brings together Professor John Polanyi, who was awarded the
Nobel prize in Chemistry in 1987, Professor Yury Davidov of the
Institute of the USA and Canada of the Soviet Academy of Sciences and
Dr. Edward Teller, whose role in the development of the atomic and
nuclear bombs is legendary. From this panel, one learns the astonishing
and disturbing fact that some 25% of all scientists work in the military
field. Some old coals are raked over in relation to historical events, but
the call for openness in relation to nuclear weaponry is refreshing.
The Comment by Professor Oscar Schachter, a leading international
lawyer of profound vision, sets the scene in terms of international legal
regulation. Vision is crucial, but alone can be counter-productive.
Schachter carefully and thoroughly, as far as that is possible in a short
commentary, lays out the applicable legal norms. Principles such as those
of proportionality and noncombatant immunity are stressed as helping to
focus on important values and the role of international law is seen as
assisting the responsible officials and indeed the public at large to direct
attention to basic policies. However, the temptation sometimes indulged
in to exaggerate hopelessly the influence of international law is quite
correctly put into context. In his final sentence, which could bear much
repetition, Schachter comments that "[l]aw has its appropriate and even
its essential role, but we do it no service by ignoring the political and
psychological contexts which limit this role".
The proliferation of nuclear weapons is an issue which, with the
demise of the Cold War, has now attained a particular importance. As
the super-powers halt and gradually reign back their fearsome nuclear
arsenals, new powers are emerging on that brink of acquiring such
weapons, if not actualy over the brink. One has to mention in this context
Iraq, which is seeking to add nuclear weapons to the chemical weapons
it possesses and which it has already used to devastating effect both upon
Iranian soldiers and its own innocent Kurdish citizens. Would its
possession of such weapons lead to a balance of terror with Israel, in a
stand of mutually assured destructive deterrence? Or would it mean that
the next war in the Middle East, should there be one, would inevitably
involve recourse to chemical and nuclear armouries? A horrifying
prospect.
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Panel 2 sought to come to terms with some of the underlying problems
related to the international effort concerning non-proliferation. Professor
Yoram Dinstein of Tel-Aviv University deals with some issues relating to
the Non-Proliferation Treaty of 1968 from an Israeli perspective. That
perspective, not necessarily limited to Israel, is one of a small state not a
member of a powerful alliance including a nuclear power, which is
actually under military threat. One has to bear in mind also the proven
destructive capacity of conventional weapons. Three issues have to be
addressed. First, where one's enemies are not members of the 1968
Treaty, who is to decide which state is to join at which time? Not a simple
question when mutual trust is by definition lacking to say the least.
Secondly, how should one cope with the very short 3 month period of
notification of withdrawal from the treaty provided for in article 10?
Thirdly, the nature and structure of the International Atomic Energy
Agency, which is supposed to supervise the mechanism.
Answers cannot be provided in a mere brief review, but glib and facile
responses to states facing real dilemnas will not suffice.
More general questions relating to international humanitarian law are
discussed in the Panel 3 deliberations, and it is enough to draw attention
to the thorough contribution by Professor Leslie Green, a noted expert in
the field.
Two further issues must be mentioned in this review. First, the
interesting and important discussion relating to the use of national legal
systems when faced with in effect an executive policy decision on an
international relations question. Professor Cottler, draws an interesting
picture of the position in Canada, noting the importance of the Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and ensuing caselaw and it is asserted that peace
has now become a justiciable issue. However, Chris Greenwood correctly
raises the issue of whether courts of law are an appropriate place in which
to decide questions relating to national security. To the extent that courts
ought to be able to examine the claim of the executive that a particular
problem is one of national security, the answer must be positive.
Otherwise the simple assertion of national security would suffice and that
cannot be right. However, this cannot extend to the determination by a
judge, of a major issue, such as the possession of nuclear weapons.
Nevertheless, the increasing intermingling of international and domestic
legal argumentation and process is of value and to be encouraged.
The final panel deals with the responsiblity of the legal profession and
the person who chose this topic is to be commended. The contributions
of Professor Burns Weston and Professor John Dugard are particularly
interesting. The former emphasises the relevance of legal skills to society
in general with regard to crucial political and social issues. Abilities in the
Lawyers and the Nuclear Debate
fields of fact-finding and negotiation, when allied to the skills in creating
institutions and building regimes, are of particular importance and must
be encouraged and used. The latter panelist, drawing upon his vast
experience in the civil liberties area of South African life, emphasises that
lawyers do not exist alone, but are part of a complex society and must
play their part in it. Their specific responsibility lies in the fields of
education, both of students and of practitioners, and of practice, in
attempting to obtain progressive decisions.
The book, as can thus be seen, ranges widely. It is stimulating and
fascinating and the clash of ideas orally expressed is particularly
interesting. This is not a heavily footnoted scholarly tome, but it is a work
of value and hopefully one that will be widely read and not only by those
whose interests lie solely in the area of nuclear weapons.
Malcolm N. Shaw Ph.D; Barrister
Ironsides, Ray & Vials Professor of Law
University of Leicester, England.
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Subrata Roy Chowdhury, Rule of Law in a State of Emergency. New
York; St. Martin's Press, 1989. $45.00.
Is there any such thing as an absolute human right? Part of the answer to
this question will be found in article 4 of the United Nations' Convenant
on Civil and Political Rights. The article says in part that "in time of
public emergency which threatens the life of the nation ... the States
Parties to the present Covenant may take measures derogating from their
obligation under the present Covenant to the extent strictly required by
the exigencies of the situation ... " Similar provisions will be found in
regional conventions on the human rights.
Such provisions reflect political and material reality. In certain
circumstances, the State must protect the rights of the collectivity. In the
words of article 29 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights,
"everyone has duties to the community in which alone the free and full
development of his personality is possible". One of these duties is to help
the community to survive, and this may include recognizing its right in
time of public emergency not to respect his usual rights.
These norms relating to states of emergency are, it must be added,
accompanied by certain guarantees (if that word can be used in the
present context) that they will not be abused. Thus, the existence of the
emergency must be officially proclaimed by the derogating State; the
measures taken must not be inconsistent with the States' obligations
under international law and not involve discrimination solely on the
ground of race, colour, sex, language, religion or social origin; no
derogations are permitted from obligation arising under certain articles of
the Covenant such as, for example, the right to be free from torture; and,
finally, States availing themselves of the right of derogation must
immediately inform, through the intermediary of the Secretary-General
of the United Nations, the other parties to the Covenant of the provisions
of the Covenant from which it has derogated and of the reasons by which
it was actuated.
The fact is, however, that in international practice many States do not
observe their obligations under the Covenant; and even where a state of
emergency is officially proclaimed and reported to the Secretary-General,
it may not threaten "the life of the nation" nor are the measures taken by
the derogating States of a kind "strictly required by the exigencies of the
situation". It may indeed simply be a case of an authoritarian regime
acting in its political interest.
It is because of these failures of States to observe their obligations
under article 4 of the Covenant that there has been so much interest in the
article, especially by such non-governmental organizations as the
Rule of Law in a State of Emergency
International Commission of Jurists and the International Law
Association. Mr. Subrata Roy Chowdhury's book is a scholarly and
exhaustive exegesis on the Paris Minimum Standards of Human Rights
Norms in a State of Emergency of the International Law Association,
with ample reference to other studies such as those undertaken by the
International Commission of Jurists. It is without any doubt an important
and useful book which should be part of any library collection on the
world law of human rights.
The book is, however, marred by one highly controversial position
taken by the author. He writes on page 15 that emergency situations may
be envisaged in three different situations. Broadly speaking, he asserts,
emergency situations may be envisaged in situations resulting from: (a) a
serious political crisis (armed conflict and internal disorder); (b) force
majeure (disasters of various kinds); or (c) particular economic
circumstances, notably those relating to underdevelopment.
He then, strangely enough, goes on to write that while the travaux
priparatoires cover the first two situations, they do not mention the third,
namely, underdevelopment. The reason for this is very simple. Neither
the United Nations Human Rights Commission nor the General
Assembly - and the writer of this review was an active participant at
both - intended public emergencies to include underdevelopment. If
Mr. Chowdhury were correct, the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
would have little meaning for many so-called developing countries which
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J. Patrick Boyer, Local Elections in Canada, Toronto: Butterworths,
1988, pp 581.
This book is the fifth in a series by the same author, and the same
publisher, on Canadian Election Law. The previous books (with their
sub-titles) are as follows: Political Rights (The Legal Framework of
Elections in Canada); Lawmaking by the People (Referendums and
Plebiscites in Canada); Money and Message (The Law Governing
Election Financing, Advertising, Broadcasting and Campaigning in
Canada); and, Election Law in Canada (The Law and Procedure of
Federal, Provincial and Territorial Elections (two volumes)). The present
book is sub-titled "The Law Governing Elections of Municipal Councils,
School Boards and Other Local Authorities". The sub-title is a fair
representation of its contents.
Chapter One, described as "An Overview" of "Democracy and Local
Elections in Canada", is a good introduction. One feels that the author
himself is present, whereas in successive chapters it is the statutes behind
the text that shape much of what is said. Apart from Chapter One, the
text basically is a paraphrase of legislation in narrative form. It is a good
deal more readable to someone who is not experienced in the study of
statutes or who does not have a need for the exact language of the
statutes, by-laws ("by" is Anglo-Saxon for "town": the author is dealing
with a mighty long tradition, going back to the involvement of the
medieval merchant guilds in local government and the Renaissance rise
of the commercial corporation), and regulations. A lawyer who has a
client behind him will want access to the original legal materials, but I
can see the book serving to give him or her a quick fix on a subject that
may not be at the forefront of her or his mind.
Beyond that, I should think the book will be useful to the "actors" in
municipal-local government: politicians, bureaucrats, concerned citizens
who find themselves involved in the "body language" of local politics,
and trade union officers who must get as tired of reading statutes as they
do collective agreements and union constitutions and municipal by-laws.
Although the text instantly addresses the limited subject of elections,
leaving the dynamics of local politics perhaps to another book or other
authors, one is reminded of distinctive characteristics of local affairs.
Municipalities do not have a protected constitutional base, being
dependent for their lives on provincial legislation. Local elections tend to
be biennial, giving little breathing space to the politician. The politician
is much more accessible to the citizen, in the tradition of the New
England Town Meeting (peace be to the United Empire Loyalists), both
formally, through council and committee meetings, and informally,
through visits and phone calls and headlines and letters to the editor. And
Local Elections in Canada
the trade-offs in choices are palpable and immediate: road repairs,
negotiated wage rates, Expo or Olympics, and taxes. One is reminded
also of the separation of (and linkage between) municipal politics and
primary-secondary education, the latter with a long Canadian tradition of
being embedded in the "grass roots" through elections, boards,
committees, and parent-teacher associations and wire fences (to separate
Catholic, Protestant, Separate, Public, Private, Hebrew, Non-conformist
("hedge-row") children from their own kind in their own generation),
and school teacher collective bargaining. And one must recognize the
difference between the poly-centric mega-cities (the "Greater" cities) of
Montreal, Toronto and Vancouver and those that still project a "home-
town" image of one-ness. (I was born in Saskatoon, and in my
imagination I still know what that means: Nutana, and the end of the
street-car line.)
Further, although some politicians use local government as a spring-
board to provincial and federal politics, most stay close to the hurly-burly
of local politics, and land development.
The author, a native of Manitoba, a graduate of Carleton University
and the University of Toronto Law School, is listed as chairman of the
Northern Institute for Public Policy Research, Secretary to the Empire
Club of Canada, and member of the Writers' Union of Canada. He is the
sitting Progressive-Conservative Member of Parliament for Etobicoke-
Lakeshore, having won the seat in 1984 and having retained it in 1988.
A.W.R. Carrothers
Professor of Law Emeritus, University of Ottawa;
Honorary Professor of Law, University of Calgary;
Founding President, Institute for Research on Public Policy.
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Johannes G.C. van Aggelen, Le r6le organisations internationals dans la
protection du droit d la vie. Brussels: E. Story-Scientia, 6ditions juridiques
et fiscales, 1986, ix + 104 pp.
The emerging role of international and regional organizations toward the
realistic protection of the right to life (along with closely related
guarantees) constitutes the scope of the scholarly treatise, which is an
outgrowth of the author's participation at the Research Center of the
Hague Academy of International Law. Precisely Johannes van Aggelen
of the Center for Human Rights, United Nations Office at Geneva, is one
of the rising scholars of the coming generation of human rights lawyers.
Indeed, his work in such closely related fields as humanitarian law, the
Arab-Israeli conflict, the right to an adequate food supply and supporting
medical care, environmental protection, the impact of science and
technology on law, the law of outer space, plus the practice of the
Netherlands Government in international law and relations attest to the
range of his high level of competency.1 In fact, this wide range of research
is clearly reflected in his approach to the protection of human life.
Whereas the participants at the Center for Research in International Law
and Relations are required to prepare an in-depth article or chapter in a
volume,2 van Aggelen prepared his own full-length book that will
become the standard work, with regard to the future role of multinational
organizations. Most authors (including this reviewer 3) place their
emphasis on the injured individual or racial group that has become the
direct target of discrimination, which in turn oftentimes leads to physical
destruction.
While the book does not intend to offer a complete expos6 or
evaluation of all ramifications of the degree of protection afforded by
those international organizations that have been selected for analysis
in terms of four selected premises, as will be shown below - the
distinguished author clearly presents a penetrating analysis of these
designated points of departure. In short, the book under review presents
a clearly defined analysis of the rights of individuals and groups,
especially as beneficiaries of the experiments, and resulting legal
1. E.g., J. van Aggelen, "Decolonization: Dutch Territories", - Encyclopedia of Public
International Law - (to be published).
2. E.g., W. Gormley, "The Elimination of Child Labour and the Protection of Young Workers
by Means of International Human Rights Conventions", in: New Directions in International
Law 413-46 (R. Gutierrez Girardot, M. Sarin eds 1982); and Gormley, "The Codification of
Pacta Sunt Servanda by the International Law Commission: The Preservation of Classical
Norms of Moral Force and Good Faith" (1970), 14 St. Louis U. U. 367.
3. E.g., W. Gormley, The Procedural Status of the Individual before International and
Supranational Tribunals (1966).
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standards, of organizations. These topics selected for examination have
been intensively studied and researched. Accordingly, a major
contribution to human rights literature has been produced.
Chapter 1, Preliminary Observations, establishes the foundation for the
author's inquiry, in that his definition of the right to life moves beyond
the mere physical survival of mankind, i.e. "droit A la survie." Though in
no sense derogating the indispensable nature of the continued physical
survival of mankind, he contends, and quite correctly, that the "right to
life" encompasses not only civil and politcal rights but, simultaneously,
economic, social and cultural guarantees. The effect of this merging of
existing human rights provisions from customary and codified public
international law is that the newer concept of the "right to living" arises
as the contemporary standard, which also includes both the physical and
mental well-being of the human person. Indeed, the quality of life
becomes the focus of his inquiry. The next step is to determine those
conditions, pursuant to which the droit d la vie can be realized under the
present political climate.
The author's approach becomes controversial in that he clearly moves
beyond the strict confines of public international law, in order to consider
the framework in which the "right of life" must function. Numerous
factors determine the application of human rights norms, especially at the
regional level, as multinational institutions seek to give effect to the goals
of human rights protection.
Four main areas, encompassing the social and political context within
which multinational institutions must function, along with the degree of
legal competence possessed by these organizations, have been chosen as
points of departure for the following examination. These "facteurs
determinants" provide the structural limits, namely the framework of the
inquiry and the focus of the study.
I. La culture.
Human rights must evolve and subsequently be implemented within
specific societies. These norms must function within the scope of
numerous other cultures, as universal rights are promulgated that are
deemed to be jus cogens. 4 Even though the right to life is clearly within
the orbit ofjus cogens and is a right erga omnes that must be respected
by all sovereign states, the impact of differing cultures must not be
minimized. An illustration would be the treatment - and the legal status
4. W. Gormley, "The Right to Life and the Rule of Non-Derogability: Peremptory Norms of
Jus Cogens", in: The Right to Life in International Law 120-59 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1985).
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- of women and children within a given social order. Sexual
discrimination, accompanied by racial hatred, is ever present as a form of
governmental policy, in most countries. Accordingly, such discrimination
becomes the focus of experiments on the part of international
organizations in their attempts to promulgate universal standards as can
be seen from the efforts of the United Nations, the Economic and Social
Council (ECOSOC), the United Nations Commission of Human Rights,
and the Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities. In this regard, the sophisticated programs of
labour and human rights protection perfected by the International
Labour Organization can serve as a model for other institutions,
particularly as concerns the implementation and enforcement of
international conventions. Other agencies such as ICRC, WHO and
FAO have adopted measures that result in cooperation with
governments.
Throughout the book, van Aggelen is extremely conscious of the
functional machinery and supporting procedures that are at the disposal
of international institutions, throughout his step-by-step analysis of the
perfection of human rights norms. In turn, they reflect the specialized
missions of these organs.
II. Le niveau de developpmenL
The right to development, considered to be one of the primary examples
of the new solidarity rights (rights of the third cycle, or the third
generation of human rights)s bears a direct relationship to the right to life.
Development law is deemed to be indispensable if humankind (along
with the earth's flora and fauna) is to survive in the depressed regions.
But, as we indicated above, the author is not completely preoccupied
with the right to mere survival; rather he seeks to determine those areas
in which the right to development becomes supportive of the world's
exploding population, in terms of humanitarian perspectives. Yet, a basic
question must still be answered: who, precisely, are the direct (or indirect)
beneficiaries of this solidarity right? More precisely, who are the subjects,
e.g. individuals or those collective entities that are capable of benefiting
from, or possibly even enforcing, this right? Who are the subjects of these
additional obligations at the local, national, regional and international
levels?
5. Alston, "A Third Generation of Solidarity Rights: Progressive Development or Obfuscation
of International Human Rights Law?" (1982), 29 Netherlands Int'l L. Rev. 307; in conjunction
with Alston, "Conjuring Up New Human Rights: A Proposal For Quality Control" (1984), 78
Am. J. Int'l L. 607.
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One answer is that the international community has a duty - in fact
an obligation - erga omnes, to facilitate economic and social progress,
an observation shared by this reviewer. In other words, the international
community, not just a few of the First World States, must alleviate the
plight of the LDC.
One of the basic themes underlying the book's several theses (not
completely supported by this reviewer) is the inseparability between civil
and political rights, on the one hand, as contrasted with economic, social
and cultural guarantees on the other.6 Though in sympathy with this
approach of merging all classes of human rights for the purpose of
strengthening the right to life, the reality of attempting to extend the reach
of existing guarantees is that different methods of supervision and
enforcement are applied. These differences can easily be appreciated from
the two United Nations Human Rights Covenants and, likewise, from the
Council of Europe's conventions in its European Treaty Series. In the
reviewer's submission, the more that rights are sought to be extended, the
weaker they become, largely as the result of assertions of state
sovereignty. Thus, the jus cogens nature of the right to life can be
weakened if the "right to living" incorporates too many other phases that
have been traditionally classified as economic and social guarantees.
However, the main consideration are the methods of enforcement, for
instance, the European Commission of Human Rights can only deal with
those rights contained in the European Convention of Human Rights.
Similarly, the Human Rights Committee (pursuant to the Optional
Protocol) is limited to those rights that have been codified into the Civil
and Political Covenant. Moreover, any attempted broadening of these
rights will of necessity result in the petition being declared inadmissible.
The jurisprudence of the European Commission of Human Rights is
unyielding.
Such observations merely highlight the controversial nature of the
evolution of human rights protection by international institutions,
because the basic issue remains: how much emphasis should be placed on
human survival 7 and what resources remain to further human
development? As van Aggelen demonstrates in the following chapters,
6. Accord, Dr. Ramcharan, "The Concept and Dimensions of the Right to Life", in: The Right
to Life in International Law 1-32 (B. Ramcharan ed. 1985); and Jhabvala, "The International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights as a Vehicle For the Global Promotion and Protection
of Human Rights" (1985), 15 Israel Y.B. Human Rights 184-203; Gormley, "Book Review"
(1987), 81 Am. J. Int'l L. 486,
7. E Meghistu, "The Satisfaction of Survival Requirements", in: The Right to Life, supra note
6, at 63-83.
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the destruction of human life continues as deliberate governmental
policies.
III. Leprogrbs scientifique et technique de la biologie et de midicine.
This third determining factor reflects the increasing awareness of the
impact of science and technology upon positive law. Hence, the progress
presently being made in the biological sciences and in modern medicine
at the global level is impacting upon millions of human beings, who in
this instance, become the beneficiaries of modern methods of sanitation
and of life preserving systems.8 Once again, the fundamental issues
become evident: who possesses the required locus standi to enforce these
rights on behalf of the subjects and beneficiaries of the law? For instance,
medical ethics must be in a position to resolve such issues as to what
disposition must be made of confidential medical records. How far must
the need to receive sophisticated medical care be extended at public
expense; and what choices will be made during the process of
safeguarding the sanctity of human life, primarily in those situations in
which limited medical facilities are available?9
The solution provided (and well chosen) is the adoption of a modern
Code of Medical Ethics that would provide guidelines toward the
resolution of some of these main issues, such as the use to be made of
medical discoveries and the responsibility of the medical profession.
Included would be the role, if any, of governments, along with applicable
law, civil and criminal, that may become relevant in specific cases. The
prolongation of physical existence by means of life support systems is a
clear illustration, with science becoming even more sophisticated. Yet, to
what extent do the contemporary norms of human rights protection
require that life be prolonged at government expense? From this premise,
what ethical and moral factors (including decisions of conscience)
become subject to legislation, such as artificial insemination, transplants
of vital organs, and the creation of new life forms by medical
engineering? Likewise, negative ramifications become relevant, such as
medical negligence, which not only will result in personal injury and
8. "On peut se demander par consequent A juste titre si la cat6gorie des moins privil6gi6s est
suffisament prot6g6e par des soins mdicaux contre les resques majeurs de l'environment
physique et biologique; cette question touche i un aspect fondamental du droit i la vie." J. van
Aggelen, "Le r6le des organisatios internationales dans la protection du droit A la vie" 5 (1986)
[hereinafter cited as Droit A la vie]. See also T. van Boven, "Les Nations Unies et les droits de
I'homme" (1983), 43 Ann. du droit de Louvain 165, 167, 169.
9. Reflecting the language of the Helsinki Declaration, "Final Act of the Conference on
Security and Co-operation in Europe" (1975), 14 I.L.M. 1292. Droit A la vie, supra note 8, 6
n.6.
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suffering, but simultaneously violations of human rights. One concrete
example would be the protection of prisoners from medical experiments.
Accordingly, the subsequent level to be considered is the role of
international organizations in implementing a future international code of
medical conduct, which must incorporate the non-derogable right to life,
as codified into article 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant. 0
Of these four points of inquiry, the human right to be guaranteed
medical care receives the most intensive coverage throughout the
remainder of the treatise, as for example the discussion of case law.
IV. L'6tat actesjuridiques internationaux
The protection of the earth's environment follows logically from the
discussion in the prior section, for the author treats medical and
environmental problems as counterparts, largely because of the tragedies
caused by pollution. Beginning with the Stockholm Declaration on the
Human Environment," of 1972, the thrust of this section, and similarly
throughout the subsequent portions of the book, is directed toward the
quality of life. In sum, the individual is deemed to be a beneficiary of the
emerging environmental law at the global level, for the reason that a pure
and decent environment is one of the conditioning factors of the right to
life; consequently it becomes an obligation erga omnes, in the author's
submission.12 In sustaining this thesis, the author relies on the Council of
Europe's efforts. Specifically, the proposal of Professor Heinhard Steiger
to attach an additional protocol to the European Convention on Human
Rights is cited approvingly.' In order to bring environmental rights
within the sphere of competence of those organs created pursuant to the
European Convention (especially the European Commission of Human
Rights and the European Court of Human Rights), the only means
whereby this objective can be realized is through the adoption of such a
10. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted December 16, 1966), G.A.
Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR. Supp. No. 16,49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966) (entered into force
March 23, 1976).
11. United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, U.N. Doc. A/CONE 48/14, at
2-65, and Rev. 1 (1972).
12. Accord, Gormley, "The Right of Individuals, and Their Protecting States, to be
Guaranteed a Pure and Decent Environment: The Emerging Legal Obligation of the World
Community to Preserve a Stable Ecology" (in preparation).
13. H. Steiger, The Right to a Human Environment Proposals for an Additional Protocol to
the European Human Rights Convention (1973); discussed in W, Gormley, Human Rights and
Environment The Need For International Co-operation 90-96 (1976). See also R. Dupuy,
Proposals for a Short- Term and Medium- Term Program of the Council of Europe in the Field
of Human Rights, Consultative Assembly Rec. No. 683 (1972); discussed in W. Gormley,
supra at 89-90; and Droit A la vie, supra note 3, at 9.
856 The Dalhousie Law Journal
protocol. Sad to say, the High Contracting Parties are hesitant to extend
the jurisdiction of the Council of Europe over the environmental field.
At the world-wide level a similar hesitancy exists; thus it becomes
necessary to determine precisely the competence of international organs
to deal with issues of water and air pollution, as intensified by nuclear
contamination in terms of a universal law of human rights. That is to say,
there are juridical barriers to the enforcement of these environmental
guarantees, owing to assertions of state sovereignty.
Written prior to the tragedy at Chernobyl, this section concludes with
a clear recognition of the dangers caused by nuclear pollution and its
resulting medical consequences. Indeed, contemporary events are
demonstrating the long-term efforts on the quality of life (including the
right to survival) posed by nuclear fallout.
The second section of the First Chapter deals with those juridical acts
that may be taken by international organizations in cooperation with
sovereign states. Though concentrating on the role of multinational
institutions, the author never loses sight of the need for cooperation (and
coordination) with sovereign states. Thus, unilateral, bilateral and
multilateral actions - especially treaty commitments - provide the
legal basis for international, juridical acts, such as intergovernmental
accords, the programs of intergovernmental organizations, and
multilateral conventions that have been promulgated by international
conferences. From this context, the categories of international institutions
are examined. Consequently, the author considers the possible
contributions of temporary and permanent institutions, along with
regional bodies. The unique jurisdiction of specialized organs of the
United Nations, along with their particular functions, are examined. In
addition to the defined and limited competence of entities such as ILO,
FAO, and WHO, it needs to be recognized that the great regional
institutions, i.e. the Council of Europe, the OAS and the OAU all possess
limited and clearly defined spheres of competence, in terms of the
organizational objectives. May this reviewer suggest that there may arise
a problem of competence when existing institutions attempt to extend
their acts over the "right of living" and environmental protection. Beyond
question, the role of traditional institutions, including non-governmental
entities, is changing, as can be seen from the recent activities of
ECOSOC, ILO and WHO. Since World War II, these agencies have
created "soft law" by means of resolutions, recommendations and
directives. Deriving their authority from constitutions and establishing
treaties, they have contributed to the creation of a positive law of human
rights. The ILO is the primary example.
Yet an additional problem arises. Is the thrust of such an organization
primarily legislative or consultative in nature? One obvious response is
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that true "international legislation" does not, in fact, exist. On the other
hand, the ILO, with its tri-partheid structure, does produce binding
international treaties. On the other end of the spectrum, do resolutions of
the United Nations General Assembly constitute customary international
law, or are they merely evidence of positive law, or conversely, are these
resolutions merely recommendary on governments? Obviously, such
questions cannot be resolved within the confines of the book under
review. Suffice it to state that regulations and recommendations of
organizations contribute to the evolution of human rights protection; but,
as the author so clearly recognizes, the question of the competence of a
particular organization to enact "legislation" is always controversial.1 4
Furthermore, the methods of adoption must be analyzed. Once again, the
ILO becomes the primary example of binding conventions, on the one
hand, as contrasted with recommendations that are non-binding, but can
be adopted as treaty texts at a future date.
In this regard, a non-governmental organization, the International
Committee of the Red Cross, is selected as the primary illustration of the
promulgation of global standards of protection, which, in turn, are
adopted by states parties, as is shown in the concluding chapter.'"
Following this brief, though challenging, exposition of the author's
purpose and scope of the study, two major chapters set forth the book's
precise, reasoned context. The step-by-step examination contains the
material supporting his contentions that international organizations can
play a decisive role in the implementation of human rights protection.
Chapter II, The International Organizations and the Protection of the
Right to Life,16 reviews the travaux preatoires of the main human rights
instruments that confer jurisdiction. 17 Starting with the United Nations
Charter, as it sets forth the right to life, along with supporting rights, the
basic thesis is advanced: the right to life encompasses considerably more
than the assurance of a mere physical existence. At this stage of the study,
the numerous programs of multinational institutions must be considered.
In particular, articles 5 and 6 of the Civil and Political Covenant
enunciate, as codified positive law, the universal principle derived from
customary law, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the
14. Compare the directives, regulations and recommendations of the European Communities,
which have varying degrees of legal force within the member states. A number of these
community acts deal with environmental standards, especially air and water pollution. As
concerns the traditional criteria, see, e.g., 1-9 M. Hudson, International Legislation (1931-
1950).
15. Notes 49 & 55 infra.
16. Droit A la vie supra note 3, at 17-49.
17. Id. at 19; including the author's analysis of the concept of "arbitrary." id. at 21ff.
858 The Dalhousie Law Journal
United Nations Charter. In short, this universal principle of the right to
life - and the absolute prohibition on the arbitrary taking of human life
- imposes a sacrosanct (or jus cogens) obligation on states parties to
respect and protect these rights, which is required by article 5.
The counterpart, however, is the protection of the security of the state;
this defense has been vigorously interposed by sovereign states, before
such fora as the European Commission of Human Rights and the
American Commission of Human Rights. As a result, a major corpus of
case law exists, in which state interests have been clarified by these
organs, although individuals have been accorded a high degree of
protection when viewed against the classical remedies of international
law.
Newer areas of conflict continue to arise in the application of the right
to life. When does life begin? One possible answer is that at the moment
of conception there is an independent physical condition or existence.
This section concludes with an analysis of the growing jurisprudence of
the Human Rights Committee. This organ, established pursuant to the
Optional Protocol of the Civil and Political Covenant,"8 has developed a
major corpus of case law that can serve as valuable precedent for the
interpretation of emerging human rights.
The purpose of the chapter has been accomplished with considerable
skill; it reviews the main law-making contributions of the above
mentioned organizations.
The next topic is a discussion of United Nations conventions that
afford some degree of protection to the right to life,' 9 namely the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide20 and the International Convention on the Suppression and
Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid21 These specialized conventions
will have even greater significance in the future if, and when,
international action is undertaken, as for example before an international
criminal court, to be discussed below.22
18. Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (adopted
December 16, 1966), G.A. Res. 2200A, 21 U.N. GAOR, Supp. No. 16, 49, U.N. Doc. A/
6316 (entered into force March 23, 1976).
19. Droit A la vie, supra note 3, at 24ff.
20. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (adopted
December 9, 1948), G.A. Res. 260 (Il1) A, GAOR, 3d Sess. (I), at 174, U.N. Doc. A/810, 78
U.N.T.S. 277 (entered into force January 12, 1951).
21. International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid
(adopted November 30, 1973), G.A. Res. 3068, 28 U.N. GOAR, Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N.
Doc. A/9030 (entered into force 18 July 1976).
22. Note 39ff infra.
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Intergovernmental organizations that are directly involved with the
protection of life include the WHO, which is now dealing with problems
resulting from deliberate pollution; moreover, it is collaborating with the
International Atomic Energy Agency in attempting to establish minimum
standards to protect personnel exposed to radiation. Indeed, these
experiments will prove to be highly significant toward the protection of
humankind and the quality of life.
The book's first section concludes with a recognition of ILO and its
sophisticated system of labour and human rights protection that has
become indispensable to safeguard continued human existence. It has
perfected its own ordre public, pursuant to its constitution, which has
been implemented by conventions and recommendations.
Part II, the counterpart to the United Nations, is the Conference of
Islamic Organization. Thus, the Islamic Organization is classified as an
international institution rather than as being regional in scope, for the
purpose of serving as a counterpart to the United Nations. The reality of
the author's approach is that he has not only employed the French
language, but has adopted a French format and philosophy.23
Founded in 1969, this newest player in the human rights arena has
extended the protection of international human rights by means of the
Universal Islamic Declaration of the Rights of Man,24 which protects the
right to life in its first article.
May this reviewer offer a suggestion, despite the fact that it may go
beyond the book's narrowly defined scope? The League of Nations - as
a truly internatinal institution, approaching universality - did afford a
significant degree of protection through its experiments in Upper Silesia
and Woodrow Wilson's Mandate System. The Mixed Commissions had
considerable success in resolving disputes between German and Polish
interests, though the technique of mixed commissions had a dismal
record in the Greek-Turkish disputes. When states refuse to cooperate in
a spirit of good faith, international fora can achieve relatively little
success.
Although no longer in existence, would it be desirable to treat the
League as the counterpart to the United Nations, for the purpose of
analysis, rather than upgrade the Islamic Conference, which is more in
the nature of a regional organization of the type discussed in the
following section?
23. On the negative side of this approach, the book lacks a much needed index.
24. Universal Islamic Declaration of Human Rights 1981 (proclaimed by the Islamic Council
to mark the anniversary of the 15th century of the Islamic era, Paris, 19 September 1981).
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Intergovernmental Organizations of a Non-Universal Character, the
topic of section three, represents the most significant advance in the
perfection of multinational machinery. That is to say, the Council of
Europe and its organs; the jurisprudence of the European Commission of
Human Rights, which presently has perfected the largest corpus of case
law; 25 plus the achievements of the OAS represent the great
accomplishments of the twentieth century. Obviously, the detailed
analysis cannot be fully treated within the scope of this review. It should,
however, be mentioned that the contributions toward the medical and
scientific aspects of human rights protection are examined at some length,
in terms of the actions taken by these organs. One example is the
discussion of the abortion cases, in relation to article 1 of the American
Convention that prohibits discrimination. 26
The OAU is noted in passing, even though it has yet to perfect a
distinct jurisprudence.
This significant chapter concludes with a review of the position of non-
governmental groups, particularly as relates to their efforts within the
framework of ECOSOC, as permitted by article 71 of the U.N. Charter.
Within this context, the author's treatment of Amnesty International 27
comes to grips with the book's fourth rubric, detention under illegal
conditions that can lead to extra-judicial executions, as for example in
Chile, Equatorial Guinea, Guatemala, South Africa and Uganda. Other
examples of private institutions that are contributing to the protection of
human life include the International Commission of Jurists, the World
Medical Association, and the International Committee of the Red Cross.
The "manifestations" of those actions that have been taken to protect
the right to life, the topic of the extensive third chapter, 28 logically
follows. At this stage in the book, the accomplishments realized by
multinational institutions are surveyed. The corpus of positive law,
including case law and legal precedent, as discussed in the prior chapter,
must be reconsidered in terms of the specific programs (and experiments)
undertaken by these major organizations. The thrust of this chapter is
directed toward gross violations of the right to life, e.g. the customary
concept of genocide that was subsequently codified into the Genocide
25. It is a bit difficult to determine which international court has decided the largest corpus of
case law. Historically, the Arbitral Tribunal for Upper Silesia resolved in excess of two
thousand cases. In terms of contemporary practice, the Court of Justice of the European
Communities has handed down the largest number ofjudgments.
26. Droit i la vie, supra note 3, at 37ff.
27. Id. at 42.
28. Id. at 51-85.
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Convention. 29 In the author's submission, Genocide represents the most
savage violation of the right to a continued physical existence and a mere
survival, even during periods of emergency. Hence, genocide is the logical
starting point for his inquiry.30
In practice, the difficulty encountered by men of good will is to
determine if those state actions in question that result in massacres do in
fact fall within the narrow definition of "genocide," i.e. "actions
genocides"'3t However, the author attempts to extend this concept to
include mass murders and crimes against humanity, as for example the
massacre of the Armeniens after World War One.
As was true of the prior chapter, he delves into the applicable case law,
in this instance that of Adolf Eichmann for the purpose of illustrating the
jurisdictional criteria, e.g. whether it be territorial or universal.32 Further,
can there be a retroactive effect of such mass crimes against humanity? In
this case, the issues are still being debated; nonetheless, the Eichmann
case has created valuable precedent that supports the global-type rule of
law sought by van Aggelen. From this foundation, proposals are
advanced that would establish an international criminal court, designed
to protect human life, under the authority of article 6 of the Civil and
Political Covenant. But such a court might be limited to cases arising
under this far-reaching concept of genocide, at least during its formative
stages.
Involved in the interpretation of genocide is the possible extradition of
nationals, possibly state officials, to stand trial before a multinational
tribunal. In this type of criminal proceeding, an act of state or crimes
committed pursuant to governmental policies, may still be placed at issue.
Indeed, such considerations led to the Genocide case.33 Unfortunately, the
issues posed have yet to be resolved, notwithstanding the efforts by the
United Nations to prevent the crime of genocide and to protect minorities
from extinction. The author, therefore, reviews the actions of the United
Nations (particularly of the General Assembly), ECOSOC, the
Commission of Human Rights, and the Sub-Commission on Prevention
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities.
29. Genocide Convention, supra note 20.
30. R. Lemkin, "Le Genocide" (1946), 17 Rev. int'l de droit penal 371; and R. Lemkin,
Genocide as a Crime Under International Law (1947). Cf "De plus, les crimes internationaux
n'ont pas encore fait l'objet d'une codification precise." Droit i la vie, at 64.
31. Schwelb, "Crimes Against Humanity" (1946), 23 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 178; and Schwelb,
"International Conventions on Human Rights" (1960), 9 Int'l & Comp. L.Q. 654,657.
32. Attorney-General of Israel v. Eichmann, (1968), 36 Int'i L. Rep. 5, 24-25; cited Droit d la
vie, supra note 3 at 55 n.21.
33. Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, [1959] I.C.J. 15; discussed Droit 4i la vie, at
57-58.
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The second illustration of crimes against humanity that do in fact
approach the savagery of genocide is apartheid. Obviously the continuing
regime of apartheid in Southern Africa is the most pressing issue facing
those U.N. organs mentioned above.3 4 In fact, the resolutions of
ECOSOC and the U.N. General Assembly culminated with the
International Convention on the Elimination of Apartheid.35 The
important consideration is that apartheid is directed against racial groups,
as such. Accordingly, the author discusses the broader concept of political
genocide, which in the reviewer's submission moves beyond the
Genocide Convention that was originally adopted. It should be noted
that in 1945 there were enlightened proposals to include economic and
political genocide, but they were rejected by the victoriuos allies, which
were unprepared to accept such sweeping limitations on the exercise of
their absolute sovereignty.
Still, there are contemporary attempts to expand the genocide concept,
as a form of customary law. There are also serious proposals to extend
this norm into related fields, such as environmental protection by
adopting a convention against the practice in modern warfare of
ECOCIDE, namely, the deliberate destruction of the environment. 36
Indeed, the reviewer strongly supports the extension of the genocide
concept into additional areas by means of new international conventions
that will deal more directly with contemporary situations, such as
international criminal responsibility. The primary example of the type of
convention sought is the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination,37 because of the methods of
implementation that are available, such as individual petition and the
establishment of supervisory organs. In view of the success of this
convention (along with those cited above38), proposals continue to be
advanced seeking an international criminal code, supported by an
international criminal court. The premise defended by the author and
quite correctly, is that codification will be required.39 In this instance, the
34. Id. at 61.
35. Note 21 supra.
36. R. Falk, "Environmental Warfare and Ecocide Facts" (1973), 9 Rev. belge de droit
international 1.
37. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(opened for signature March 7, 1966), 660 U.N.TS. 195 (entered into force January 4, 1969).
38. Supra notes 10, 11, 15, 18, 20, 21; in connection with notes 49 & 51, infra.
39. Adopting the proposal of C. Bassiouni, Commission des droits de l'homme, R6s 12
(XXXVI) du 26 f6vrier 1980; Rapport de M. Cherif Bassiouni, Doc. E/CN. 4/1426 du 19
janvier 1981; cited in Droit A la vie, at 63, n.64. The author concludes: "La crime de g6nocide
en tant que crime contra l'humanit6 devrait 6galement &re jug6 par une telle cour." Droit A la
vie, at 65.
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desired treaties and subsequent establishing tribunal would be created
pursuant to the convention on the suppression and prevention of
apartheid,40 with the possibility of additional protocols that would extend
its jurisdiction over those international crimes that were codified in
multinational conventions. Apartheid could be included within this
scheme, and state responsibility (and collective responsibility) would
arise. Furthermore, an additional protocol to this 1973 convention is
being considered by the International Law Commission, along with its
study of state responsibility.
Section III, The Question of Involuntary Disappearances, including
forced disappearances, 4' is all too closely related to apartheid and even
genocide. The present South African government continues to violate this
phase of the right to life, including arrest without charges and
imprisonment without trial. Moreover, the Government of Liberia
employs this practice on a regular basis to achieve the destruction of an
entire racial group. Forced disappearances, therefore, have become a
major violation, owing to the mass disappearances in Latin America.
Notwithstanding the severity of this institutionalized practice (as for
example in Argentina, Chile and Guatemala) it is not really a new
phenomenon. Dictatorships of the left and the right have used this illegal
conduct to destroy their opposition, namely individuals and groups.
Thus, public authorities - citing the "need" to preserve public order and
the security of the state - have permitted and even encouraged excesses
by those in positions of authority, especially by their military
commanders.
The significant consideration, demonstrated throughout the book, is
that these illegal measures, and violence of a general nature, result in
common factors that are evident on all continents. For instance, no
formal recourse is at the disposal of the victims; no measure of habeas
corpus is available; and there is a lack of judicial protection being offered
to detainees. These practices are under investigation by the U.N.
Commission of Human Rights. For certain, the United Nations is in a
position to render major contributions in this area.
The subsequent stage is that of disappearances on the part of those who
have been illegally detained. This phenomenon is both a regional and a
global tragedy, even though Latin America is the area that is experiencing
the retrograde impact on human rights protection. Accordingly, it is
difficult for the human rights organs and the parent United Nations to
40. Note 21 supra.
41. Section III, Droit a la vie, at 65-74.
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provide effective relief, because of the fact that highly placed
governmental officials - especially the military - are at fault.
In sum, an illegal disappearance is the first step toward the imposition
of degrading treatment, torture, and extra-judicial executions.42 The worst
offenders are Argentina and Chile, as can be seen from the jurisprudence
of the American Convention of Human Rights. Within these countries
there have been disappearances of opposition leaders on a massive scale,
and the practice has been intensified by the disappearances and
enslavement of women and children, who lack judicial protection.
Consequently, the liberty and security of the person - and human
dignity - is violated. Detention is accomplished under inhumane
conditions, minus minimum standards of treatment, thereby jeopardizing
not only the right to life, but similarly the right to living. Following arrest
(all too frequently at night) by the security forces or paramilitary units,
the subjects are interrogated by the military, oftentimes at secret
locations. The accused are held incommunicato, since the authorities
refuse to indicate the location of these victims or, for that matter, even
admit that they are being held in custody.
The next stage in this illegal chain of events is the systematic torture
and even deliberate extermination of selected individuals and designated
groups of minorities. Accordingly, the issue becomes: where does liability
fall? Is the government liable, or are specific officials liable, in law, for
their illegal acts and brutal violations of human rights? Precisely, the
author asks: has there been governmental approval or, alternatively, are
individual military commanders acting on their own authority when
committing atrocities? In such a situation, is political responsibility
imposed on state agencies? Are government forces involved in these
disappearances, or does the government passively tolerate these viscious
practices and subsequent disappearances? It may also be asked: does the
government only interrogate and intimidate, on the one hand, or
systematically "eliminate" a group? Perhaps the beginnings of actions
that may eventually fall within the sphere of genocide can be detected.
In this series of questions, albeit legal issues, van Aggelen is especially
conscious of institutionalized discrimination against groups and segments
of society, in addition to private individuals.
The next consideration in his line of reasoning is the possible recourse
that may be available following such disappearances - all too frequently
after the victim has been murdered. The answers provided are directed
toward the efforts of United Nations organs. For example, in 1980 the
U.N. Human Rights Commission set up a working group to examine the
42. Id. at 67ff.
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situation of the disappeared. Thus, the regime in Chile was treated at its
first session. The author, as is frequently done throughout the book,
considers the procedure adopted by the particular organ, e.g. any replies
received from governments, those resolutions adopted by the
commission, plus subsequent actions taken by the United Nations
General Assembly.
Numerous illustrations, such as the appointment of a special
rapporteur, are provided in an attempt to demonstrate how the role of
international bodies is implemented. In fact, the appointment of special
rapporteurs is one of the devices that has been employed with
considerable success and will be utilized in the future. Such detail, e.g.,
the examination of Guatemala and Argentina cannot be reconsidered
within the scope of this review, but such a detailed analysis is of unique
importance to the safeguard of human rights. Suffice it to say that the
defenses are also taken into account. Guatemala declared that
disappearances resulted from the general atmosphere of violence and not
from state action, whereas Argentina objected to the jurisdiction of the
Human Rights Commission. The government alleged that the
commission had exceeded its original mandate. Secondly, Argentina
contended that these disappearances were not on a large scale and,
therefore, could not constitute a gross violation of human rights. Rather,
the phenomenon of disappearances resulted from the activities of
"criminal organizations" and terrorist groups. There were, it was alleged,
various types of terrorism that were employed to overthrow the
government. 43
At the present time, a further consideration comes into play: is the new
democratic government in Argentina to be held responsible for the acts
of the former dictatorship? A partial solution may be forthcoming from
the examinations by the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimina-
tion and Protection of Minorities. This body is currently surveying
measures of discrimination that are being applied against minorities and
their resulting impact upon the disappeared, as the result of deliberate
governmental policy.44
The proposal offered by the distinguished author is that an
international writ of habeas corpus be made available.
The American Commission of Human Rights, in its proceedings
against Bolivia and Guatemala are also compared, particularly the
collaboration between the working group of the U.N. and the American
43. Id. at 70-71 & passim.
44. The sub-commission presents a number of proposals, id. at 71.
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Commission, which represents the type of international cooperation that
is so desperately needed to deal with these tragic violations.
In evaluating the above mentioned accomplishments, there must not
be a false impression created, in view of the fact that the U.N. and OAS
have been unable to resolve the problem of the disappeared in Latin
America. This practice, sad to say, continues with respect to internal and
international conflicts. In fact, military regimes of both the left and the
right resort to such illegal acts in their attempts to eliminate opposition.
Moreover, similar practices are common throughout the African
continent, as an institutional method.
Some possible relief may be found in Protocol One to the Geneva
Conventions of 1949.45 Consequently, the International Committee of
the Red Cross continues to deal with some of these aspects discussed
above. However, the solution is an international convention, with
supporting structures and enforcement machinery, to protect detainees
and the disappeared. 46 On the other hand, it is necessary to recall the
travux preatoires of the 1977 Protocols: a fifth Geneva Convention was
the desired solution. Unfortunately it was unacceptable to states: they
insisted upon freedom of action in non-international conflicts.
Owing to the viscious nature of this practice, there exists a humane
responsibility on the state, in question, to adopt such a specialized
convention to deal with the disappeared. In this context, these victims are
also subjected to cruel and degrading treatment - also becoming an
example of a gross violation of human rights that has a direct bearing on
the right to life.
From this perspective, the topic of illegal executions follows both
logically and in practice. At this stage of the inquiry there is necessarily
a return to the struggle for mere survival. Furthermore, the extensive use
of "legal" executions that only satisfy formalistic criteria must not be
minimized, particularly during periods of hostilities. That is to say, capital
punishment continues to be debated within U.N. agencies, since its use as
a criminal penalty is legal under clearly specified situations under the
human rights conventions, examined in this book. There are, however,
steps being taken to limit the death penalty to those exceptions already in
existence. If this approach be adopted - as currently exists pursuant to
the American Convention of Human Rights, in article 4(2) - no
45. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949 [infra note 55] and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), U.N. Doc.
A/32/144, 15 August 1977 (opened for signature 10 June 1977) (entered into force 7
December 1978). See also note 55 and the conventions cited.
46. Droit i la vie, at 74 n.101.
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additional categories involving the application of the death penalty would
be permissible. But this approach overlooks the growing demand for an
extended use of the death penalty within industrialized societies. Since
1968 the whole question of the use of the death penalty - as a legal
deterent to protect society - has been under investigation by the U.N.
General Assembly, ECOSOC, and the Human Rights Commission.
Additional factors, e.g. the inherent differences between civil and military
tribunals, must be taken into account at such time as the permissible
categories of the death penalty are examined, with a view toward
restricting its further use.47
The resolutions of the General Assembly and ECOSOC invites
governments to provide legal guarantees to persons accused of crimes
that carry the death penalty. Furthermore, multinational institutions are
insisting that administrative relief in the form of executive clemency, as a
matter of grace by the sovereign, be placed at the disposal of those
convicted, for the reason that commutation of the death penalty must be
included as a balance that may be exercised by the executive branch. This
duty, placed directly on states parties to the aforementioned international
conventions, already has its basis in positive law. In 1973 the U.N.
Secretary-General requested ECOSOC to present an analytical report. In
turn, questionaires were sent to governments in order to detect the
number of executions that might violate the right to life. In particular, the
protection of women and children was considered as an indispensable
phase.48
The result of efforts by U.N. agencies (too numerous to recite within
the scope of this review) is a proposal to add a protocol to the Civil and
Political Covenant that will outlaw the death penalty. 49
At the regional level, a similar development can be detected, in view
of the fact that the Council of Europe is attempting to abandon the death
penalty, as can be appreciated from the recent efforts of its Juridical
Committee, the European Ministers of Justice, and the Parliamentary
Assembly.50 Specifically, the main thrust of recent actions by the Council
of Europe is to guide the High Contracting Parties in their efforts to
modify their internal legislation. However, a simultaneous undertaking
can be seen from attempts by the Parliamentary Assembly to obtain a
revision of article 2 of the European Convention of.Human Rights, in
47. Commission des droits de l'homme, Res. 16 (XXIV) du 8 mars 1968, G.A. Res. 2393
(XXIII) 26 mars 1968; cited in Droit A la vie, at 74 n.106.
48. E.g., Droit i la vie, at 76.
49. Draft Second Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. U.N.
Doc. A/C. 3/35/L. 75, at 3-5. See note 55 infra.
50. R6solution 727, du 22 avril 1980; cited in Droit A la vie, at 77 n.1 17.
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order to abolish the death penalty. Subsequently, the text of the desired
new protocol was transmitted to the Committee of Ministers. This
additional Protocol Number Six5' can be compared with its U.N.
counterpart, in that the death penalty will be eliminated.
An even more advanced development can be seen in the American
Convention of Human Rights, because of the fact that the most severe
limitations have been placed on the application of the death penalty: the
permitted categories are closed. No additional crimes may become
subject to execution; moreover, upon ratification of the American
Convention, state parties may not - under any conditions - extend the
use of this penalty, even as to categories permitted by the American
Convention.
It was shown above that scholars are seeking to have an identical
standard applied to international human rights, in order to prevent any
further extension of the death penalty. Thus, an analysis of article 4 of the
American Convention is provided, but for the purpose of this review it
must be mentioned that the use of this penalty is limited to serious crimes
that have grave consequences. May this reviewer suggest, therefore, that
the American Convention be subjected to intensive study for the purpose
of determining if its sophisticated provisions are having the desired effect.
Secondly, would it be practical to apply these criteria at the international
level?
The author's careful treatment of regional standards concludes with a
review of the practices in Northern Ireland,52 in which extra-judicial
executions have, tragically, become a fact of life. On the other hand,
excessive force has been applied by the security forces, on the theory that
the degree of force employed was necessary to effect a lawful arrest.
Therefore, the necessary amount of force (or the minimum force that
may be required) becomes the fundamental issue, when life is to be
safeguarded.
The next stage in the author's presentation is to deal with illegal (or
extra-legal) executions that have become the more pressing practices at
the global level. In short, the number of illegal killings far exceeds judicial
executions. There is a disproportionate number of summary executions of
detained persons; furthermore, there is a tendency of dictatorships to
institutionalize this practice of arbitrary killings by the military,
51. Protocol No. 6 to the European Convention For the Protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms Concerning Abolition of the Death Penalty, Council of Europe H
(83), 3, 14 February 1983; cited in Droit A la vie, at 77 n. 119. See especially art. 3 of the
protocol.
52. Ireland v. United Kingdom, European Court of Human Rights (1978), 21 Y.B. Eur. Cony.
Human Rights 602-12.
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paramilitary and civil police. Sad to say, the numerous violations cited
earlier once again become relevant, as for example racial discrimination
resulting in apartheid and genocide. The ultimate impact is the
destruction of entire groups. To illustrate, the Human Rights Commission
and the sub-commission on prevention of discrimination have been
gravely concerned with protection of minorities and the prevention of
racial discrimination. Going back as far as 1975 and 1979, the practices
of the Government of Kampuchea were examined by the special
rapporteur.
Yet, in addition to the practice of international agencies, the theory -
in this instance the development of human rights law - was clarified. In
brief, what is the precise meaning of extra legal (extrajudiciaire)? Several
factors such as the definition of "arbitrary" or "summary" execution must
be determined in the first instance. But, realistically, it will become
increasingly difficult to detect the dividing line between a summary
execution and a minimal juridical proceeding, if guerrilla warfare
continues. Fortunately, the author comes to grips with this type of
unresolved legal issue, when he offers numerous illustrations of violations
of the right to life for the purpose of detecting the common elements that
are contained within such violations. Examples are: not being represented
by competent counsel, lack of an impartial judiciary, the application -
retroactively - of the death penalty, the use of revolutionary or
improperly constituted tribunals, frequently existing outside the normal
judicial systems, and sentences that are not passed pursuant to law and
not subject to judicial review.53 Tragically, numerous instances of these
practices come to mind: the result is all too frequently arbitrary
executions.54 Conversely, some relief might be forthcoming if the
governments in question would respect their commitments under the
1949 Geneva Conventions and the two 1977 protocols,5 5 relative to the
protection of the victims of armed conflicts.
53. Report on the Situation of Human Rights in El Salvador, OAE/Ser. L/V/Il/46, Doc. 23,
Rev. 1, at 51-52 (1978); cited in Droit A la vie, at 83 n.141.
54. Id. at 83ff.
55. The 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, 6 U.S.T.
3316; 75 U.N.T.S. 135. The 1949 Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition
of the Wounded and Sick in Armed Forces in the Field, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31; The
1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 267; as extended by Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts
(Protocol I) U.N. Doc. A/32/144, 15 August 1977 (opened for signature 10 June 1977)
(entered into force 7 December 1978) [supra note 49]; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva
Conventions of 12 August 1949; and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-
International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II) (entered into force 7 December 1978); contained
in D. Schindler & J. Toman, The Laws of Armed Conflict 551-636 (2d ed. 1981).
In connection with notes 15 & 49 supra.
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In evaluating the numerous violations of human rights, the counter
measures taken by multinational institutions, and the significant body of
case law, the distinguished author advances some observations that lead
into the concluding chapter. As concerns international crimes that have
been perpetrated under the authority of domestic legislation, the
conclusion is beyond dispute: state responsibility ensues and, likewise, for
its high officials and agents. Furthermore, this level of responsibility is
not, and cannot be, derogated in time of war or national emergency. As
a consequence, the state has a moral and legal obligation to adopt
corrective measures of a legislative and judicial nature and, secondly, to
redress prior violations and resulting injuries, in the author's well chosen
conclusion. Included within this concept of state responsibility are those
officials who have been responsible for past violations and injuries.
The proposed solution is the adoption of a code of professional
conduct that may remedy the above mentioned abuses of individual
rights and, secondly, provide guidelines that would regulate the military,
paramilitary and civil police. The object of such a code of conduct would
be to insure the proper application of the law. Appropriate justice could
be directed toward those officials who were responsible for illegal
executions. Possibly the most controversial phase of the author's
proposed code of conduct are those provisions imposing universal
jurisdiction over those officials, who would become subject to
prosecution wherever they might be located. In this regard, it would be
possible to have dual (and concurrent) jurisdiction, if a territorial
competence were also present, for the reason that these are crimes against
humanity, and they also constitute crimes against peace. As a result, they
can be deemed offenses that are incalculable. Included are crimes
committed by foreign armies. Accordingly, appropriate legislation is
required to provide legal remedies.
One of the underlying themes advanced throughout the book is the
function of non-governmental entities, but as concerns the application of
universal jurisdiction over crimes against humanity, private groups are in
a special position to obtain and disseminate information concerning
illegal executions. Here, then, is a highly significant function that can be
exercised to aid the efforts of international organizations, since world
public opinion can be directed toward the protection of the right to life,
including the right to living.
The concluding chapter 6 brings together the author's theses, namely,
that the right to life is the fundamental human right, which incorporates
newer guarantees, particularly the right to development, in terms of
56. Droit 4 la vie, at 87-89.
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unique cultures. Fundamental to this approach is the concept of the
indivisibility of all human rights - a position challenged by this
reviewer, owing to the differing methods of enforcement. In any event,
one legal norm becomes controlling: the right to life occupies a position
ofjus cogens and is peremptory; therefore, it must be respected by states
and protected by means of municipal legislation, in view of the fact that
this right is non-derogable. Precisely, there is an obligation imposed upon
governments to protect this right to national constitutions, which has
already been accomplished in the majority of instances, at least at the
theoretical realm. The duty of states to implement and enforce these
human rights within their sphere of municipal law is clear: the duty exists.
Yet, in practice, many states do not consider the right to life to be
inalienable.5 7 Thus, the difference between the theory and practice of law
becomes all too evident. The proposal and solution is for the international
community - within the framework of the United Nations - to insure
these rights by means of treaty texts and by developing the law in a
scientific manner, which is being advocated by the U.N. General
Assembly. 58 Henceforth, the legislator - at the national and
international levels - must strive toward the institutionalization of these
norms. Although significant accomplishments can be cited, as has been
done throughout the book, their work has been insufficient, for they have
not succeeded in implementing these norms.
It must now become the domain of international organizations to
achieve the desired goals. Consequently they must assume the primary
responsibility, because of the fact that they possess the special skills to
promulgate the required codifications. They must, therefore, codify and
develop human rights law.
From this perspective, the most competent organ is the United Nations
Commission of Human Rights, which has perfected a number of such
international conventions, including the Political and Civil Covenant and
the 1984 Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel Inhumane or
Degrading Treatment or PunishmenL 59 Included should be the series of
57. Id. at 87.
58. Id. at 87 n.2.
59. G.A. Res. 39/46, 10 December 1984, U.N. Doc. A/RES/46, 17 December 1984. See
also Commission des droits de l'homme, Res. 1948/21 (adopte le 6 mars 1984); cited in Droit
A la vie, at 87 n.3.
See generally, N. Lerner, "The U.N. Convention on Torture" (1986), 16 Israel YB. Human
Rights.
In terms of regional solutions, see also Inter-American Convention to Prevent and Punish
Torture, AG/Res. 783 (XV - 0/85), O.A.S. GA Doc., OEA/Ser. P. AG/Do. 2023/85,
Rev. 1, at 46-54, March 12, 1986. O.A.S. T.S. No. 67; reprinted I.L.M. 519 (1986).
872 The Dalhousie Law Journal
conventions designed to combat terrorism. 60 Still, the primary
codification remains article 6 of the Political and Civil Covenant.
Notwithstanding the fact that seventy-five states have ratified (and
thereby accepted the duty to implement this right within their internal,
domestic orders), flagrant violations of the requirements set forth in
article 6 are increasing, particularly within the developing world. In sum,
the crimes of genocide and apartheid, the institutionalization of
disappearances of individuals and illegal executions by governmental
authorities, accompanied by the excessive use of force (frequently
resulting in death) are all too common. The tragedy for mankind is that
these practices are accelerating rather than being contained. Conse-
quently, it should be demanded that international organizations perfect
adequate solutions and, subsequently, work for their adoption. In the
author's view, the main responsibility rests on international organizations
to ensure that states act in conformity with the standards of the global
community. Yet, it may still be asked: can international organizations that
clearly are not supranational assume such a dynamic supervisory role?
What are the realistic limits to the competence of the international and
regional organizations that have been examined in the book? Tragically
for all of mankind, this reviewer must concede that the sovereign state
remains supreme, as can be appreciated from the political climate existing
within the multinational institutions, and particularly within United
Nations organs.
In spite of these observations, it may still be possible to envisage the
creation of an international criminal court that will have jurisdiction over
crimes against humanity and gross violations of the right to life. Indeed,
the author is especially conscious of the jurisdictional difficulties when
advancing his final recommendations. Accordingly, he again presents his
far-reaching conclusion: states have an obligation under international
human rights law to prevent these crimes and to submit to compulsory,
60. Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, done at
Tokyo (opened for signature September 14, 1963), 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No. 6768, 704
U.N.T.S. 219; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, done at the
Hague (opened for signature December 16, 1970), 22 U.S.T. 1641, T.I.A.S. No. 7192, 860
U.N.T.S. 112; Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil
Aviation, done at Montreal (opened for signature September 23, 1971), 24 U.S.T. 565, T.I.A.S.
No. 7570, 24 U.N.T.S. 574; Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against
Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, done at New York (opened
for signature December 14, 1973), 28 U.S.T. 1975, T.I.A.S. No. 8532, and the International
Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 39 at 23, U.N. Doc.
A/34/39 (1979); reprinted (1979), 18 I.L.M. 1456.
See also Measures to Prevent International Terrorism which Endangers or Takes Innocent
Human Lives or Jeopardizes Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 40/61 (Adopted December
9, 1985), A/Res/40/61 (XL) (14 January 1986); reprinted (1986), 25 I.L.M. 239.
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universal jurisdiction, in order to fulfill the rights of victims, even though
the possibility of criminal proceedings remains repugnant to sovereign
states. They continue to be fearful of any extra-territorial jurisdiction that
may be exercised by such fora.
The right to life continues to face the special dangers posed by
derogation, during periods of conflict. Consequently, the vital - and
indeed unique - task of the ICRC, relative to the protection of
designated classes of persons under the 1949 Geneva Conventions and
the 1977 Protocols, serves as the prototype of the desired legal order.
That is to say, the ICRC, as it strives to implement its major conventions,
becomes the model for the type of solution so desperately sought.
In terms of models and prototypes of required schemes of human
rights protection, this reviewer feels compelled to suggest that van
Aggelen continue with his outstanding research in this area and produce
additional texts - including some in the English language - that are
even more exhaustive of the future role of international organizations.
Therefore, the book should be considered as a link in a chain of scholarly
undertakings.
W. Paul Gormley, J.D., Ph.D.
Catholic University of America,
International Lawyer,
Attorney-Adviser for the Library of Congress
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Yambrusic, Edward Slavko. Treaty Interpretation: Theory and Reality.
Lanham: University Press of America, 1987, 289 + xi pp. $15.75 (paper),
$28.50 (cloth).
The inconsistencies, and conflicting theories of treaty interpretation,
constitute the foundation for the present inquiry. The thesis defended is
"that neither the judicial praxis nor international legislation, individually
or together, have provided a realistic solution to the fundamental
challenge facing the International Court of Justice of finding the right
balance between stability and progressive development of international
law." This fundamental thesis reemerges at several key portions of the
text,2 when the author attempts to prove that existing standards of treaty
interpretation are inadequate, on the ground they do not lead toward that
degree of predictability and certainty, which he feels is required by
governments in this nuclear age. Accordingly, the norms of treaty
interpretation must be reexamined, but with a definite goal in mind,
namely, "the new international law of 'social' interdependence ' 3 will
prevail over positivistic, classical law.4 As the author observes, and quite
correctly,
the fundamental challenge of the twentieth century international lawyer is
how to close the gap between the classical international law based on the
no longer relevant assumptions of absolute sovereignty, power, and
coercion, and the new international law reflecting the new international
realities of coordination and cooperation based on the reciprocal
consensual relationships.5
Dr. Yambrusic seeks a consensus, not only as to the fundamental (and
peremptory) norms of international jurisprudence, but primarily on the
norms and methodology of treaty interpretation. Hence, his scholarly
evaluation centers, primarily, on state practice, the case law of the
International Court of Justice, the proceedings of the International Law
1. E. Yambrusic, Treaty Interpretation: Theory and Reality 4 (1987) [hereinafter cited as
Treaty Interpretation].
Throughout the text, the author employs the terms "international legislation" or "legislation"
when referring to the codification of legal norms by international organs and conferences.
While not an invalid approach, there might be some question raised as to whether the efforts
of the International Law Commission or the United Nations constitute true legislation as this
concept is typically employed in domestic law. But cf. 1 M. Hudson, International Legislation
vii-x (1931).
2. E.g., ch. IV, infra note 53, at 239. See also infra notes 38 & 55.
3. Id. at 2.
4. The seven fundamental principles are listed id. at 2-3. Cf. the underlying principles of C.
Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind 57-60 (1958).
5. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 4.
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Commission and its codification on the Law of Treaties, 6 the Vienna
Conference on the Law of Treaties7 and the resulting Vienna Convention
on the Law of Treaties.8
The four main chapters, plus the separate concluding section, deal with
these topics. Chapter One reviews state practice, the Chapter Two is
devoted to an examination of the most significant cases (contentious and
advisory opinions) that demonstrate the techniques and standards applied
by judges of the International Court of Justice when they interpret
treaties and conventions. "The purpose of the analysis is (a) to ascertain
the praxis of the Court with respect to the interpretative process, and (b)
to illustrate the wide range and scope of the parameters of the
investigation, mainly, whether there is, or can be, within the framework
of contemporary international law, the 'norm' of treaty interpretation."9
This second chapter is the most lengthy, and it provides insight into the
ICJ's judicial standards. Chapter Three, which is much narrower in
scope, surveys the drafting history of article 31 and article 32 of the
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties in an attempt to demonstrate
how the members of the United Nations, acting through the International
Law Commission, have sought to legislate general and subsidiary rules of
treaty interpretation - a result that is ultimately criticized. The Fourth
Chapter includes a short comparative analysis of the judicial and
legislative experience - which the author contends does not establish the
needed fundamental rule of treaty interpretation - serves as the
conclusion to the massive corpus of material included within the study.
In view of the above recited summary of the book's general structure
and contents, this reviewer feels that it might be helpful, at this point, to
indicate the primary conclusion and recommendation, that are advanced.
Dr. Yambrusic indicates, in regard to the areas of judicial interpretation
and legislative-type codification, that the existing norms of treaty
interpretation are inadequate because certainty and predictability cannot
be provided to states and the political (and administrative) organs of
6. 1966 Draft Articles on the Law of Treaties, Report of the International Law Commission,
18th sess. 4 May-19 July; [1966] 2 Y.B. Int'l L. Comm'n 7, U.N. Doc. A/CN. 4/SER. A/
1966/Add. 1 (1966); (1967) 61 Am. J. Int'l L. 248. See generally, H. Briggs, "Reflections on
Codification by the International Law Commission and Other Agencies" (1969), 126 Recueil
des Cours 233-316; and H. Briggs, The International Law Commission (1965) (as concerns the
evolution and progressive development of international law by the ILC).
7. Final Act of the United Nations Conference on the Law of Treaties, UNGA, U.N.
Conference on Law of Treaties, A/CONE 39/26,23 May 1969; 8 I.L.M. 728 (1969).
8. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (adopted May 22, 1969) (opened for signature
May 23, 1969) (entered into force 27 January 1980), UNGA, United Nations Conference on
the Law of Treaties, A/CONE 39/27,23 May 1969; 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969).
9. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 5.
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international institutions. Consequently, he advocates the norm of the
total approach to treaty interpretation, thereby not rejecting any of the
classical and modern criteria of interpretation but, at the same time, not
relying exclusively (or even primarily) on the plain and ordinary meaning
of words, the primacy of the text, the intention of the parties, the specific
context in which the treaty will function, the hierarchy of norms of
interpretation, the use of the travaux preparatoires, and those codified
rules contained in the Vienna Convention.
Oddly, the author merely indicates the superiority of the total
approach, the concept is never examined; and its precise content is never
explored. This reviewer wonders why there was not a major section or
chapter - possibly in the nature of a concluding chapter - in view of
the fact that a recommendation was being advanced, though not
defended. Admittedly, the reader will be able to detect the author's
purpose. On the other hand, the book takes a negative approach in that
the shortcomings and weaknesses of traditional criteria are analyzed at
considerable length. Conversely, relatively little is indicated as to the total
approach theory, with the result that the treatment of the theories in
question appears to be uneven. Would it not have been highly desirable
to subject the "total approach" to an equally penetrating analysis,
especially of cases in which this standard had been successfully applied?
This reviewer, accordingly, has a number of questions that might still be
asked, particularly if any hierarchy of existing norms might emerge, as the
new international law evolves? Realistically, a review of possible
questions that have not been raised in the book must necessarily lie
beyond the scope of this short review, yet it can be anticipated that Dr.
Yambrusic will elaborate upon the "total approach" in subsequent
publications. If correct in his analysis, major contributions will be
forthcoming, for, as demonstrated in the book under review, there are
major conflicts and even weaknesses within the existing rules of
intrepretation, particularly in the Vienna Convention. As the author
maintains in his concluding remarks to the introductory comments, he
"demonstrates the major flaws in both the legislative and judicial
experience"10. He explains that,
the author develops his approach of the "total context," which in his view,
should better lend itself to the ultimate goal of assuring legal objectivity,
certainty, and predictability in the interpretative process. The "total
context" approach should also facilitate the equilibrium between the
stability and progressive development of international law by closing the
gap between the classical and "new" international law within the matrix
10. Id. at 6.
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of a legal frame of reference rather than the mere subjective consideration
of fact and policy.I
The reviewer believes that it is helpful to keep in mind the author's
purpose and recommendation when examining the book's subsequent
chapters. It might even be asked if the author goes beyond the scope of
strict treaty interpretation? A negative answer must necessarily be
forthcoming because of the fact that it is essential to deal with the factual
context and the time period in which cases were decided.
Chapter I, Interpretation of Treaties - Conceptual and Theoretical
Developments and State Practice12 sets forth the basic theories that will be
tested in the book's two main chapters and, secondly, it reviews the legal
standards applied by a few of the major states. Although one of the
shorter chapters, a good deal of material has been included. It also
appears that the author is seeking to synthesize the classical views, e.g. of
Vattel,13 with the modern approach of the late Judge Alvarez.14
Therefore, the new international law of Judge Alvarez serves as
inspiration, and even precedent, for the author's proposals - an
approach also favored by this reviewer.' 5 May it, therefore, be suggested
that the contributions of the late Judge Alvarez are of special significance
to a number of rubrics of contemporary international law, especially
treaty law and human rights protection, as is subsequently shown in
connection with the series of South West Africa cases.' 6 Indeed, the basis
of Alvarez's (and to a large extent of Yambrusic's) theories can be seen
in the premise that "a legal precept once put into effect acquires a life of
its own"' 7. Judge Alvarez continues:
Their development is to be judged according to new international
conditions and without regard to the intentions of those who created the
law or established the convention. Even if the text of a precept or a
convention is clear, the text should not be applied, subsequently, if such
11. Id.
12. Id. at 9-54.
13. E. Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law (edition of 1758) (Trans
C. Fenwick); reprinted in (1961), 8 The Classics of International Law 199; cited in Treaty
Interpretation, supra note 1, at 9.
14. A. Alvarez, Le Droit international nouveau - son acceptation - son itude 106 (1960);
cited in Treaty Interpretation, supra note, at 11.
15. W. Gormley, The Implementation of the United Nations Human Rights Covenants:
Contemporary Legal Precedent and Future Procedural Remedies (unpublished LL.D. thesis,
Victoria University of Manchester 1972). See especially Alvarez (dissenting opinion),
"Advisory Opinion on the Status of South West Africa," [1950] I.C.J. 128 at 174-185; (a
recognition of human rights as erga omnes); Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 117-18.
16. Note 35 infra, in connection with note 15 supra.
17. Alvarez, supra note 14, at 106; cited in Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 11.
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application could result in consequences which would be inadmissible in
view of the changed circumstances of international life occurring after the
entering in force of the precept or convention.' 8
It needs to be stressed that Dr. Yambrusic presents an objective review of
the various theories - such as textual objectivity, the "intention of the
parties" and the subsidiary means - which he intends to supercede,
though not eliminate. Thus, he is aware of the sharp differences that can
arise when the objective and subjective approaches to interpretation are
applied to a concrete dispute. Likewise, the divergent views of scholars
and jurisconsults are considered. Accordingly, the author concludes:
"Between these two diametrically opposed approaches [Vattel's classical
view and McDougal's New Haven School] one finds the whole spectrum
of variations of the 'textual objectivity' oscillating, with varying degrees
of emphasis, between the factual and legal context of the treaty"' 9. Since
the desired degree of legal clarity cannot be supplied by the publicists (as
specified in article 38(d) of the Statute of the International Court of
Justice), the inquiry shifts to an examination of state practice.20
The section devoted to common law jurisdictions is well done, even
though it is limited to the case law of the United State and Great Britain.
In fact, the analysis of the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court will serve as a valuable reference. Yet this reviewer wonders why
the leading judgments from some other common law jurisdictions were
not included. Such legal systems as those of Pakistan, Canada, Australia,
and New Zealand might help to provide some additional insight into
"global state practice." Realistically, the reviewer suspects that it was
necessary to place some limits on the areas investigated. A similar
question can be asked in relation to the discussion of civil law, i.e.
continental jurisprudence, that can be traced to the Civil Code.
Obviously, French practice dominates, but why was Austrian practice
selected as one of the three primary jurisdictions (along with the
German)? May it be suggested that some background discussion of other
national systems might have been enlightening.
Necessarily, attention must be accorded the Soviet, and Socialist,
theories and practice, which is founded on strict legal positivism. It
utilizes the text of the treaty as the point of departure, though Marxist
goals are sought, as a phase of the apparent intention of the parties.
18. Id. Accord generally Alvarez (separate opinion), "Anglo-Iranian Oil Company Case"
(Preliminary Objection) (United Kingdom v. Iran), [1952] I.C.J. 93; Treaty Interpretation,
supra note 1, at 107-08.
19. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 14.
20. Id. at 15-36.
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In considering the contribution rendered by the Second Chapter, it
becomes apparent that the differences in the results achieved through the
application of these diverse theories are stressed to a greater extent than
are the similarities. He concludes, and quite properly, "that the
parameters of the relevant frame of reference are being determined by the
character of the treaty, its historic context, and the specific terms of
reference of the interpreter"21. May it further be suggested that the key to
fully appreciating the approach of Dr. Yambrusic is to grasp the
"categorical imperative" of "terms of reference" employed to interpret a
particular treaty. This phase of the "Yambrusic approach" becomes
increasingly evident not only in terms of municipal case law, but
especially when the judgments and advisory opinions - along with the
dissenting and separate opinions - of the justices on the International
Court of Justice are studied in the subsequent chapter.
Beyond question, the discussion of national case law serves as a basis
for the remainder of the book, because he concludes that the states which
follow the Civil Code tend to emphasize legal referents (the relationship
between municipal and international law) as they relate to the meanings
of the terms and language employed. Henceforth, the text of the treaty
speaks for itself. Conversely, the socialist and common law jurisdictions
recognize the inherent limitations of language, for extrinsic evidence plays
a different role. Of course, the differences between the U.S. and U.K.
practices are also enunciated in the analysis, since the British rely on the
textual approach - or textual objectivity22 - whereas greater deference
is placed on the travaux preparatoires of the treaty by a majority of
American jurists (including this reviewer). Significantly, the author shows
that "American courts have rejected the notion of 'rules' of interpretation
as obligatory legal norms .... Rather, the various canons of interpreta-
tion are used as guides. ' 23 American courts utilize the text of the treaty as
their point of departure in seeking the intention of the parties in terms of
the surrounding circumstances.
The final conclusion to the First Chapter is that the evaluation of the
above mentioned jurisdictions reveals that there are no universally
accepted formal rules. "The state practice failed to reveal any clear
coherent set of principles deemed by states as obligatory rules of
21. Id. at 35 (emphasis added).
22. ld. at 18-19.
23. Id. at 26 (emphasis in original). Although the author begins his analysis by citing the
Restatement (Second) of The Foreign Relations Law of the United States S 147 (1965), he
relies primarily on a case analysis, particularly the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 19-27.
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interpretation. ' 24 This conclusion becomes one of the underlying themes
supporting the remainder of the study. In view of the fact that treaty
standards of sovereigns cannot produce the desired degree of certainty
and predictability, the inquiry shifts to an examination of the case law of
the International Court of Justice. 2
The Second Chapter, therefore, undertakes a selective evaluation of
the jurisprudence of the ICJ up to 1969, the date on which the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties was adopted.26 Yet, this reviewer
wonders why two decades of case law have been omitted, in view of the
fact that recent and pending cases deal with serious issues of treaty
interpretation? For instance, the recent and pending cases involving the
United States turn on treaty interpretation.27 In fact, the omission of the
United States-Nicaragua case tends to reduce the book's sense of realism,
in the opinion of the reviewer.
The specific purpose of this chapter is to ascertain, if possible, "the
central issue or issues involved, how they were resolved, what method or
methods of interpretation were used by the Court (including separate and
dissenting opinions), and what role, if any, the modes of interpretation
have played in the ratio decidendi of the Court... ,,2. In other words, is
there, or can there be, a single primary "norm" of treaty interpretation? 29
In order to arrive at an answer to this question, the author adopts the
inductive method of case analysis, namely, a positivistic approach for the
purpose of detecting the criteria employed by individual judges at such
time as treaties and conventions are examined. At this point in the study,
the emphasis shifts away from the views of theorists and concentrates on
the dispute-resolution process. Specifically, the cases are not examined in
their entirety; instead only those portions that shed light on the
interpretative process are considered.30
24. Id. at 36.
25. Ch. 2, "The Jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice", id. at 55-167.
26. Note 8 supra. See id. at 55.
27. E.g., Case Concerning Delimitation of Maritime Boundary in Gulf of Maine Area
(Canada v. United States) (Judgment), [1984] I.C.J. 246; Military and Paramilitary Activities
in and Against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States) (Merits) (Judgment), [1986] 1.C.J. 14;
Elettronic Sicula S.p.A., (United States v. Italy), I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 87/2, 9 February
1987; and I.C.J. Communiqu6 No. 88/5, 18 March 1988.
28. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 55.
29. Id.
30. The reliance on judgments and opinions of the ICJ as authoritative pronouncements of
positive international law can provide significant insights into numerous rubrics of law, as for
example environmental law and the law of the sea. E.g., W. Gormley, ch. 6, "The Human
Right of All Peoples, and of All States, to be Free From the Effects of Nuclear Fall-Out", 146-
88; and ch. 7, "The Need for International and Regional Co-operation to Conserve the Earth's
Living Resources" 186-212, Human Rights and Environment (1976).
Treaty Interpretation: Theory and Reality
Notwithstanding the value of the penetrating case study, an extensive
commentary would have the effect of making this review unduly lengthy.
Suffice to say, each judgment and opinion is analyzed, not only with
regard to the majority and dissenting views, but similarly, in terms of
individual concurring opinions and dissents. Of course, the purpose of the
author's survey is not to deal primarily with the substantive portions of
the numerous holdings but, rather, to isolate those rules and norms of
treaty interpretation that may provide some insight into the judicial
practice of the world's premier tribunal.3" Hence each case is accorded its
own "conclusions" in which the insight that may have been provided by
an individual judgment or opinion is synthesized. As a result, each of the
thirteen holdings can stand as a unique section if a vertical analysis is
sought. Secondly, a horizontal approach may be desired by the reader.
For instance, the opinions of the late Judge Alverez are particularly
revealing in terms of the author's "total approach." In fact, this reviewer
has long been an admirer of Alvarez's new international law, especially
as his concepts relate to human rights protection.32 It is submitted,
therefore, that there is considerable value in tracing the line of thought of
particular judges. In the present instance, moreover, the beginnings of the
author's "total approach"can be detected.33
In sum, the reviewer was especially interested in the discussion of the
Interpretation of the Peace Treaties with Bulgaria, Hungary, and
Romania;34 the South West Africa judgments,35 and the Namibia
advisory opinion.36 Indeed, at the conclusions to the South West Africa
case (first phase),37 Dr. Yambrusic again restates his basic premise "that
31. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 55.
32. Note 15 supra.
33. E.g., Alvarez (Individual Opinion) 67-72, "Advisory Opinion on Conditions of Admission
of a State to Membership in the United Nations," [1948] I.C.J. 57; Treaty Interpretation, supra
note 1, at 65; and Alvarez (Dissenting Option) 12-21; Advisory Opinion on Competence of
the General Assembly for the admission of a State to the United Nations, [1950] I.C.J. 4;
Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 65-66.
See especially, Judge Alvarez on social justice in: (Dissenting Opinion) 67-75; Advisory
Opinion on Effect of Awards of Compensation Made by the United Nations Administrative
Tribunal, [ 1954] I.C.J. 47; Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 78-79.
34. Advisory Opinion (First Phase), [1950] I.C.J. 65; and id. (Second Phase) 221.
35. South West Africa Cases (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa) (First Phase),
[1962] I.C.J. 319; and South West Africa (Second Phase), [1966] I.C.J. 6. Accord generally,
Gormley, "Elimination of the Inter-State Complaint: South-West Africa Cases and Resulting
Procedural Deficiencies in the International Court of Justice" (1967), 3 Texas Int'l L. Rev. 43
(1967).
36. Advisory Opinion on the Legal Consequences For States of the Continued Presence of
South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276 (1960), [1971] I.C.J. 16.
37. (First Phase), supra note 35.
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the justices of the Court could not agree on a 'single" norm of treaty
interpretation that could be deemed a customary rule of international
law." 38
It remained for the Namibia Advisory Opinion 39 to undo some of the
effects of the 1966 South West Africa judgment. As such, the analysis of
those standards of interpretation that were gleaned from the several
opinions illustrates the state of affairs which the author terms "juristic
subjectivity," in that "the so-called canons of interpretation were
considered merely as guides to the logical process of the interpreter's
reasoning rather than the obligatory norms to be followed by the
Court" 40 . The review of individual opinions, especially of Judges
Ammon and Alvarez, forcefully enunciates this conclusion. Therefore,
the South West Africa cases (including the Namibia Advisory Opinion)
serve as the final stage in the lengthy analysis, and interestingly, the
conclusions to this section of the book constitutes the final insight
provided by the book's longest chapter. But is it valid to criticize the
International Court and its judges for not creating rules of interpretation
or achieving legal certainty? The author presents a well documented
argument; however, there is the possibility that the strong condemnation
of the ICJ's judicial process is a bit too extreme, when it is stated that the
ICJ has failed to produce a consistent pattern of legal precedents.
There is, moreover, an admittedly minor point that detracts from the
book's objectivity. The judges are consistantly referred to as "the
American judge," "the British judge," "the Soviet judge" throughout the
chapter, as if these jurists were in fact national judges or representatives
of their governments. Without belaboring this observation, it need only
be mentioned that judges on international and regional tribunals serve in
their individual capacity and are not national delegates. 41
In yet another instance this reviewer was upset, although personal
prejudice may have intervened. Precisely, on several occasions President
Sir Percy Spender is referred to as "distinguished jurists," a designation
seldom detected in current legal literature. In view of his administrative
38. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 128.
39. (Second Phase), supra note 35; discussed in Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 130 ff.
40. Id. at 144.
41. Stat. I.C.J., art. 2, in conjunction with art. 20. Art. 5(1) (Declaration) - Rules of Court,
Acts and Documents Concerning the Organization of the Court, No. 2 (adopted 6 May 1946,
amended on 10 May 1972) - provides that every member of the court undertakes to submit
a declaration that he will perform his duties and exercise his powers as a "judge honourably,
faithfully, impartially and conscientiously."
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role in the 1966 South West Africa judgment,42 such repeated use of the
word "distinguished" detracts from the scientific objectivity of the book,
in the reviewer's submission.
The Third Chapter,43 is devoted to the exposition of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties,44 namely, articles 31 and 32. The
purpose of this chapter is to show that the "Members of the United
Nations, under the guidance and leadership of the United Nations
International Law Commission, have likewise failed [as has the ICJ] in
providing the international community with a general rule of
interpretation. . .4 In effect, the author carries forward, into his
discussion of the codification process, his conclusions from the preceding
discussion of the ICJ. It seems impossible to ensure certainty and stability
within the realm of treaty law. Possibly, then, Dr. Yambrusic is seeking
too high a goal, for the reason that a single (or even primary) standard
may be impracticable or only attainable at a philosophical level. May it
even be proposed - more in the nature of a rhetorical question - that
the "total approach" will be incapable of producing the desired goal of
certainty and predictability. Likewise, the application of the "total
approach" will not lead to clearly defined rules of interpretation or a
consistent hierarchy of law standards, in the reviewer's opinion.
While reading the earlier chapter dealing with the jurisprudence of the
International Court of Justice, the reviewer was of the opinion that a
discussion of inter-temporal law46 might have provided significant insight
into the approach being taken by a number of judges, namely the
interpretation as contrasted with the application of a treaty.47 This topic
(of special interest to the reviewer48) is treated in the subsequent section,
as it relates to the efforts of the International Law Commission and the
42. Reference is made by the reviewer to the disqualification of Judge (later President) Sir
Muhammad Zafrulla Khan by President Sir Percy Spender, thereby permitting him to cast the
"third" and deciding vote in the 1966 South West Africa Judgment (Second Phase), supra note
35. Discussed in Gormley, supra notes 15 & 35.
43. Ch. 3, "The General Rule of Interpretation of the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties - The Travaux Preparatoires, " Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 169-238.
44. Supra note 8.
45. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 169.
46. G. e Silva, "Le facteur temps et les traitees" (1977), 154 Recueil des Cours 213. See
especially ch. 3, "Droit intertemporel des traitees", id. at 265-70. Treaty Interpretation, supra,
note 1, n.27, at 220; citing Max Huber in Island of Palmas case (Netherlands v. United States)
(1928), 2 U.N. R.I.A.A. 829.
47. Additional insight into the distinction - and even the "merging" of the interpretation and
application of treaty provisions was given by the International Court of Justice in the Aegean
Sea Continental Shelf case (Greece v. Turkey) (Judgment), [1978] I.C.J. 3, at 32-34.
48. Gormley, "The Protection of the Earth-Space Environment" (1986), 19 Indian Y.B. Int'l
Aff. 106, 137.
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Vienna Conferences. 49 Parenthetically, it is to be regretted that inter-
temporal law was deleted, with a single exception, in the final
Convention on the Law of Treaties.50 May the reviewer propose,
however, that a future application of inter-temporal law may help to
clarify some of the problems left unresolved by the text of the Vienna
Convention.
The author reviews, and quite effectively, the major positions that were
defended at the two Vienna Conferences. Unanimity could not be
reached: the emerging treaty articles were the result of a series of
compromises. The effect on treaty law is that the divergent positions
expressed by the judges of the ICJ and the members of the ILC remain.
Subjectively in the selection and application of norms of interpretation -
as codified in articles 31 and 32 of the Vienna Convention - still
dominate, in the author's view. This element of subjectivity will remain
"ever present". Yet, once again, may it be asked: has the author become
a bit too severe in his criticism of the ICJ and the ILC, in terms of the
existing political climate?
Conversely, there was - and remains - certain preferences, namely,
two basic approaches: the "majority view" supports the notion that
words have a natural and ordinary meaning and, secondly, a significant
minority position that words, by their very nature, are ambiguous and
have meaning only within the context in which they function.5' As seen
from the work of the distinguished rapporteurs of the ILC, and the replies
from governments, a consensus could not be reached. Only compromises
were possible, as the author illustrates in his discussion of the two sessions
of the Vienna Conference. It is not unfair to conclude that this conference
reflected the basic divisions that persist between governments and
jurisconsults, with the effect that any further compromise became
difficult. The review of these two sessions demonstrates the inevitable
reality: the parties accepted solutions with which they were "disatisfied"
for the purpose of salvaging the conference and "agreeing" upon a final
text. On the positive side, the delegates rendered a major contribution by
arriving at a text that was opened for signature and which entered into
force. The solution, which did not achieve the fundamental rule of
interpretation sought by the author, provided - in draft article 27,
49. E.g., Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 176, 178, 182, 190, & n.27, at 220.
50. G. e Silva, supra note 46.
5 1. May the reviewer again propose an examination of this problem in terms of inter-temporal
law, i.e. the differences, if any, between the interpretation and application of a bilateral treaty
or multilateral convention at such time as a dispute must be resolved.
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general rules of interpretation, supported by supplementary means of
interpretation in draft article 28 - a hierarchy of standards that can be
applied to concrete situations depending on the degree of additional
clarity desired. May it be suggested that considerable clarification has
resulted from the texts of draft articles 27 and 28, which emerged as
articles 31 and 32 in the final codification. At the very least, customary
international law has been codified and developed by the ILC and the
final Vienna Convention.
The reviewer wondered why the author did not provide any
conclusions to his third chapter? Rather, the chapter just "stops,"
following a single page review of the position taken by Professor Nahlik,
who observed that recourse to the so-called historical standard of
interpretation might only confirm the meaning arrived at by the use of the
primary means set forth in draft article 27. Nonetheless, there may also
be a change in the prior standards of interpretation. Consequently, he
recognizes the value of employing subsidiary means of interpretation, but
limited to those situations in which additional clarity was required.
[Parenthetically, the reader will discover that the expected concluding
remarks have been shifted into the following chapter.52]
Professor Nahlik's suggested amendment was not pursued, owing to
the late stage of the conference. Still the basic problem remains. The
author utilizes this resulting degree of uncertainty for the purpose of
illustrating the flexibility in the application of existing treaty standards.
This approach becomes even more obvious in Chapter IV, A
Comparative Analysis of the Legislative Developments and the Judicial
Practice,53 when he seeks to synthesize the content drawn from the prior
discussion. In fact, this short chapter restates the underlying theme, i.e.
that neither international codification nor judicial reasoning "have
provided a prudent realistic answer to the fundamental challenge of the
international arbiter of how to achieve the judicious balance between
stability of treaty relations and the progressive development of
international law"54.From this context, Dr. Yambrusic undertakes a final
attempt to ascertain if a fundamental rule of treaty interpretation can be
detected, particularly within the hierarchy of law contained in articles 31
and 32 of the Vienna Convention, in terms of state practice and judicial
pronouncements. However, the author assumes the role of an advocate
when he proposes to demonstrate the major flaws in the legislative and
judicial experience. Specifically, the adoption of the "total context" is
52. Treaty Interpretation, supra note 1, at 242-43.
53. Id. at 239-46.
54. Id. at 239.
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restated, and it is proposed that this notion of "total context" "should
better lend itself to the ultimate goal of assuring legal objectivity,
certainty, and predictability...51
From the most positive perspective, the author has come to grips with
the basic shortcoming; consequently, recommendations are offered for
the purpose of bringing higher degrees of certainty and stability into the
treaty process. Conversely, earlier in this review it was indicated that the
contrary situation might emerge. Precisely, this reviewer took the position
that a full chapter should have been provided in order to explain the
content of function of the "total context," as the main criterion. In other
words, the author had recognized the problem and offered a general-type
recommendation, but he has failed to examine this approach for the
enlightenment of the reader. In view of the fact that searching and
penetrating examinations of the ICJ and ILC (along with state practice)
constitute the major portion of the text, it seems valid to suggest that an
equally severe analysis and criticism, should have been included in regard
to the proposed "total context." In the submission of this reviewer, the
book does not go far enough in dealing with the major recommendations
advanced.
It is essential not to minimize the contribution rendered by Dr.
Yambrusic in the final chapter and in the conclusions. The ILC it again
subjected to sharp criticism as is the Vienna Convention, with the
intention of indicating the inherent weaknesses in contemporary treaty
law. Beyond question, the author has rendered a contribution in raising
these issues for further consideration. By way of example, he holds:
"[O]ne can reasonably conclude that the 'general rule' of Articles 31 and
32 are not declaratory of customary international law"56. However, such
a conclusion - though it may have merit, as a means to stimulate further
investigation - may be questioned on at least two grounds. First, the
ILC and the Vienna conferences were not limited to codifying customary
law; rather the international law was progressively developed and,
secondly, the Vienna Convention evolved into customary law, during the
lengthy period in which the text remained open for ratification.
Such statements - those of the author and the reviewer - have the
advantage of focusing on some of the major difficulties of treaty law and
state practice; yet, it is necessary not to minimize the contributions of the
ILC. The author, in his conclusions,57 actually advances a strong attack
against the ILC, as for example when he argues: "[A] legislative design
55. Id.
56. Id. at 245-46.
57. Id. at 247-53.
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which produces unrealistic rules that merely conceal differences will
increase rather than reduce conflicts among states, thus weakening the
most cohesive force in the international community - the treaty
relationship among nation states"58.
Indeed, the book's conclusions follow this line of approach. But this is
not to say that the concluding thoughts are not without merit, in terms of
the author's perspective and thesis that have been defended throughout
the text. Accordingly, his final thoughts restate the subjective nature of
treaty interpretation, in terms of the objectives sought. In reality, Dr.
Yambrusic moves close to inter-temporal law when he maintains:
While stressing the objective or apparent intention of the parties, the
interpreter recognizes that words as such are ambiguous and can have
meaning only within the particular context in which they are used. The
duty of the interpreter, therefore, is to give effect to the expressed intention
of the parties in the light of the factual and legal circumstances both at the
time of the conclusion of the treaty - to establish its meaning - and at
the time of the interpretation - to establish its legal effect.59
Dr. Yambrusic concludes with strong pleas as to the future role that
arbitors, judges, legislators, and especially statesmen must assume if the
progressive development of international law is to meet the legal and
political needs of the global community. Basic to the author's approach
is the acceptance of good faith and pacta sunt servanda 60 Inherent in this
approach is a higher level of international and regional co-operation in a
spirit of good faith.61 Notwithstanding the obvious nature of these final
comments, international relations and the global legal order must
necessarily depend upon the good faith intention of the parties.
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58. Id. at 247.
59. Id. at 251 (emphasis in original).
60. Accord Gormley, "The Codification of Pacta Sunt Servanda By the International Law
Commission: The Preservation of Classical Norms of Moral Force and Good Faith" (1970),
14 St. Louis U. L.J. 367.
61. W Gormley, supra note 30.

